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ABSTRACT 
Introduction. Today there is no doubt that mergers have permeated all sectors of society, in-
cluding health care. Starting in the US, extensive waves of hospital mergers occurred at a re-
cord pace in the 1980’s typically justified by promising dramatic financial and operational im-
provements. In the 1990’s, the merger trend reached Europe and by the turn of the century 
“merger mania” had taken a strong hold within the UK. By the end of the 1990s, there had been 
a number of hospital mergers in Sweden. In 2004, Karolinska University Hospital was formed 
through the flagship merger between the Karolinska Hospital and the Huddinge University 
Hospital. In 2010, yet another prestigious merger of two university hospitals was announced 
with the formation of Skåne University Hospital. However, there has been almost no research 
on hospital mergers in Sweden. The aim of this thesis is to increase our understanding of the 
pitfalls and possibilities in merger processes by exploring the Karolinska University Hospital 
merger. 
 
The merger in brief. On 1 January 2004, the Karolinska Hospital and the Huddinge University 
Hospital merged to form the Karolinska University Hospital. Although the merger was contro-
versial and far from obvious, the merger decision passed by a single vote in the Stockholm 
County Council on 9 December 2003. To achieve a balanced budget by the next political elec-
tion in 2006, the new director of the merged hospital was told to reduce expenditures by €70 
million over the next three years. The top management delegated identical assignments to all 
clinical managers: to reduce costs and to consolidate 125 clinical departments into 74 new de-
partments each with a common management. Over the three-year period (2004 to 2006), the 
predicted cost savings for the merger were not achieved. Eventually the original implementa-
tion plan was withdrawn and the hospital director left the organization.  
 
Methodology and research questions. An embedded case study design was used to explore 
pre- and post-merger processes, in which data was collected by interviews, non-participant ob-
servation and extensive documents (allowing triangulation). Three studies addressing different 
organisational levels examined the following issues: how and why a merger decision that was 
considered “impossible” became possible (Study I); how and why top management’s radical 
ambitions resulted in an unintended convergent process and dysfunctional outcomes (Study II); 
how and why considerably different outcomes in terms of clinical integration occurred at the 
clinical department level (Study III). 
 
Results. Spanning from the years 1995 to 2007, the three studies show that the merger proc-
esses evolved through a non-linear, undirected and complex interplay between external and in-
ternal actors. The process was mainly driven by the competing institutional logics of manageri-
alism in a political and administrative arena, and professionalism in a scientific and professional 
arena. Means convergence and a politico-economic crisis led to the merger decision. The top 
management was overwhelmed by the “vertical clash” between managerialism and profession-
alism. On the clinical department level, managerial factors that hindered integration were a sole 
attention on the formal mandate from the top management, leadership based on one formal ac-
tor, and the use of a planned top-down approach to change. Managerial factors that facilitated 
integration were a dual attention to two majors stakeholders (top management and clinical 
staff), shared leadership between multiple actors, including an informal leader, and the use of an 
emergent, bottom-up management approach to change within the planned assignment. 
 
Discussion. The key finding is that the competing institutional logics between managerialism 
and professionalism seems to be the main driver of merger processes. This vertical conflict is 
probably the main explanation why intended outcomes were not achieved. While top manage-
ment followed the merger literature’s classic recommendation to focus on the horizontal tension 
and to take a planned linear top-down approach to change, the unanticipated challenge stem-
ming from the competing institutional logics made it difficult for the management to handle the 
post-merger process. A true understanding of the intra- and inter dynamics inherent in a context 
with multiple layers of competing institutional logics, such as public sector health care, seems 
essential to produce functional organizational outcomes.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 THE MERGER PHENOMENON 
Today there is no doubt that mergers have permeated all sectors of society, both private and 
public, including the health care sector. The merger phenomenon can be traced all the way back 
to the US manufacturing industry and its legendary “Great Merger Movement” from 1895 to 
1905 (Lamoreaux, 1985). During this period, it is estimated that 1800 firms were consolidated 
(Ibid.). These consolidations formed the foundation for what was later termed “big business”. 
Industrial mergers ever since have followed a similar wave-like pattern, revealing five waves 
throughout the 1900s (Barkoulas et al., 2001; Gärtner & Halbheer, 2009). In 2004, 30 000 mer-
gers were completed globally, which is equivalent to one merger every 18 minutes at a total 
value exceeding the GDP of several large countries (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). Well 
into the 2000s, mergers have remained a highly popular tool used to create value, renew organi-
zations and/or restructure industries.  
 
In the 1980s, the merger trend hit the health care sector typically justified by promising dra-
matic financial and operational improvements (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Goddard & Ferguson, 
1997). Starting in the US, extensive merger waves occurred at a record pace. While in the 
1980s, efforts focused on horizontal alignment, in the 1990s efforts focused on both horizontal 
and vertical relationships to functionally align service delivery into one integrated system 
(Ibid.). By the mid-1990s, the hospital merger activity in the US had increased nine times since 
the start of the decade (Williams et al., 2006). This was soon followed by a merger wave in the 
UK of their National Health Service trusts (NHS). Between 1997 and 2001, 99 mergers of NHS 
hospitals took place (Fulop et al., 2002, 2005) and by the turn of the century “merger mania” 
had taken a strong hold within the UK (Cereste et al., 2003).  
 
In Sweden, restructuring of the health care sector began in the mid-1980s, leading the way for 
hospital mergers in the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the merger trend reached the academic 
health care community with the formation of the Sahlgrenska University Hospitali on the west 
coast of Sweden (Brorström, 2004; Hallin, 2000). In 2004, Karolinska University Hospital was 
formed through the flagship merger between the Karolinska Hospital and the Huddinge Univer-
sity Hospital. Both were university hospitals located in Stockholm on the east coast of Sweden. 
In 2010, yet another prestigious merger of two university hospitals was announced in the south 
of Sweden with the formation of Skåne University Hospital. Although researchers agree that 
mergers of university hospitals seem to have become a “non-infrequent” phenomenon (Kastor, 
2010), there is almost no research done in this field.  
 
For over 40 years, the complex phenomenon that mergers represent has attracted robust aca-
demic interest from multiple disciplines. However, the substantial body of empirical data has 
largely produced mixed and often contradictory findings. The knowledge of mergers in health 
care is even more uncertain and scarce due to its shorter history. Because of this inconclusive 
knowledge and a continuing merger trend, it is clear that more research is needed to further ex-
amine mergers, particularly those occurring in health care. This thesis addresses university hos-
pital mergers.  
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1.2 MOBILIZING MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE 
While recognizing that mergers once began in the US manufacturing industry back in 1895, one 
might wonder how and why this phenomenon entered Swedish health care in the 2000’s? Al-
though this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, a quick overview of how and why merg-
ers may have entered the field of public sector hospitals is valuable for the later discussion in 
this thesis.  
 
Among various perspectives, the notion of competing institutional logics between managerial-
ism and professionalism provides a convincing explanation of the historical background of the 
mobilization of mergers in the health care sector (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In particular, this 
notion directs us to the wider social and political transformations in health care. At different 
time periods, different ways of organizing, financing and managing health care have dominated. 
As a particular logic dominates health care in each period, that logic has formed the basis for 
discussions on how health care should function. Scott et al. (2000) divides the US health care 
into three distinct periods. The first period (1945-1964) was a time of professional dominance; 
the second period (1965-1982) was a time of state governance and national ownership; and the 
third period (from the early 1980s and forward) has been dominated by competition, market and 
management. Although caution should be taken in drawing parallels between different coun-
tries, research shows that this historical description of different logics dominating health care in 
different periods generally applies in many Western cultures including Sweden (Östergren & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 1998).  
 
The managerial logic of health care, which now dominates health care, is based on two main 
doctrines (Estes & Alford, 1990: 174): (1) “The resurgent ideology of the market that proclaims 
that competition and efficiency are the major criteria that justify state expenditures” and (2) 
“The ideologies of individualism, neo-conservatism, and self-help that justify reductions in or 
the elimination of state expenditures altogether.”   
 
From an institutional perspective, there is a political agenda behind these doctrines that aims to 
repress the logic of professionalism that had dominated public health care in most Western 
countries (Brock et al., 1999). From a market-managerial perspective, professionalism distorts 
the operation of markets, promotes rising costs, and encourages “producer capture” of services. 
Hence, professionalism has come to be viewed as a serious obstacle to the development of ra-
tionalized managerial control (Ackroyd, 1995). Against the background of escalating health 
costs in the 1980s, the US political reformers proposed two main solutions. First, health care 
was redefined from a “social good” to an “economic good” (Shortell et al., 1985). Second, there 
were renewed calls for hospitals to adopt “business-like” structures and managerial practices 
(Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Fennel & Alexander, 1987). 
 
The mobilization of these policies involved clear attempts to replace the prevailing professional 
logic and bases of legitimacy with a countervailing logic of market-managerialism (Kitchener, 
2002). In 1981-1982, the logic of market-managerialism was further legitimized with the pass-
ing of federal legislation that encouraged competition among providers in US health care (Scott 
et al., 2000). In 1983, an even more decisive shift towards market-managerialism occurred 
when US policy moved from retrospective reimbursement of hospital costs to prospective pay-
ment linked to diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs (Ruef & Scott, 1998). This shift increased 
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competition among health care providers and gave further legitimacy to the logic of market-
managerialism.  
 
The shift towards market-managerialism in political ideology was especially difficult for US 
university hospitals (Starr, 1982) because they were required to compete with health care pro-
viders who were less burdened with the financial responsibilities of the academic mission (Reu-
ter & Gaskin, 1997). By the mid to late 1990s, such university hospitals also had ceased to be 
reasonably profitable partners for medical schools. Even elite university hospitals experienced 
substantial operating losses (Kitchener, 2002). From this institutional perspective, mergers are 
just one example of the logic of market-managerialism or the New Public Management phi-
losophy (NPM), as it is sometimes evocatively known (Kitchener & Gask, 2003; McNulty & 
Ferlie, 2002, 2004). 
 
 
1.3 DEFINITIONS 
 
1.3.1 Definitions of mergers 
Mergers can take a variety of forms – and there are many ways to categorize mergers. Typi-
cally, researchers differentiate merger types based on the relationship between the merging 
firms before the merger. The literature usually divides mergers into four major categories: hori-
zontal, vertical, conglomerate and concentric mergers (Kitching, 1967). In horizontal mergers, 
the merging firms belong to the same industry and are at the same level in the value chain. That 
is, they serve the same customers and/or use the same suppliers producing similar goods or ser-
vices. In vertical mergers, the companies also belong to the same industry, but have different 
roles in the value chain (i.e. they are customers or suppliers for each other). In concentric merg-
ers, firms either serve the same customers with different products, or offer similar products to 
different customers. In conglomerate mergers, the merging firms offer different products to dif-
ferent customers, usually to reduce financial risks through a diversified portfolio (e.g. with re-
spect to business cycles). To mention another commonly used categorization, horizontal, verti-
cal and concentric mergers belong to related mergers, while conglomerate mergers belong to 
unrelated mergers (Amit & Livnat, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986; Napier, 1989). Because we examine 
a merger between two Swedish university hospitals that offer similar services within the same 
“industry”, the definitions of merger used in this thesis are the horizontal and related mergers.  
 
In health care a merger occurs when two or more hospitals join operations to create a new hos-
pital entity (American Hospital Association, 2010). Such operational consolidations may not 
involve a legal transaction if the hospitals are owned by the same parent company. Also, multi-
ple facilities may still exist even after consolidation. Hospitals that simply cease operations ex-
perience “closures” (Ibid.). “Acquisitions” – which is more applicable for hospitals in private 
hands - are defined as the event where one or more hospitals are financially subsumed into an 
existing hospital entity (Ibid.). In this study, both mergers and acquisitions are referred to as 
“mergers” (see also Section 2.1.2). 
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1.3.2 Definition of university hospitals 
In the health care literature, it is common to talk about university hospitals, affiliated teaching 
hospitals and academic health centres (AHCs) as a single phenomenon. In this thesis, the term 
“university hospital” is used for all types of academic hospitals since it is the term used in Swe-
den. University hospitals differ from other health care providers by having a distinctive tripar-
tite academic mission: research, education, and clinical care. This implies, among other things, 
a formal affiliation and a close cooperation with a medical school. Most affiliated medical 
schools are based on collegial academic structures with a dean overseeing powerful department 
chairs who usually control large budgets. By contrast, university hospitals tend to have a more 
hierarchical structure. At their apex, a chief executive oversees departmental Directors and ne-
gotiates with medical staff (see e.g. Kitchener, 2002). Although the literature does not make any 
clear distinctions between university hospitals, it may be good to note that about half of univer-
sity hospitals in the US are owned by state governments (e.g. UCSF), with the other half in pri-
vate hands (e.g. Stanford and Harvard) (Kitchener, 2002). In Sweden all university hospitals are 
public institutions. In essence, all university hospitals are unified by the same logic of clinical 
and research excellence, which is deemed vital to realize their tripartite mission (Yusuf, 2006). 
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2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
 
2.1 MERGERS IN THE INDUSTRY 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Previous research on mergers has been dominated by US studies because most mergers have 
occurred within the corporate segment in the US. Many of these studies can be found among 
financial economists, who typically have conducted research of listed companies at the macro-
level. Bearing in mind that the governance and institutional contexts between privately owned 
firms and public sector organizations (such as university hospitals) are fundamentally different, 
it is still important to relate this thesis to previous research although it originates in the private 
business sector, because they may face many of the same managerial and organizational chal-
lenges post-merger. This section outlines the major findings resulting from 40 years of research 
on mergers in the industry.  
 
2.1.2 Mergers & Acquisitions 
In the general management literature, it is common to talk about mergers and acquisitions as a 
single phenomenon, which is reflected by the abbreviation “M&As”. Although research does 
not always make any clear distinctions between mergers and acquisitions, it may be useful to 
note one distinguishing aspect from a legal point of view. Typically, mergers are used to de-
scribe a “merger of equals” where the firms are often of about the same size, while acquisitions 
occur when one company takes control of another and clearly establishes itself as the new own-
er as reflected by the number of shares owned. From a legal point of view, in an acquisition, the 
buyer "swallows" the target company, which ceases to formally exist (DePamphilis, 2010). 
Usually one company will buy another and simply allow the acquired firm to proclaim that the 
action is a “merger of equals” (even if it is technically an acquisition) because being bought out 
usually carries negative connotations (Ibid.). Because the companies are more unified by the 
logic of going forward as a single new company, with similar goals and challenges, the litera-
ture usually treats M&As as a common phenomenon. Guided by literature prescription, this 
thesis uses the term “mergers” interchangeably for both mergers and acquisitions. The use of 
the term “mergers” also highlights the fact that the focus in this thesis is on two similar organi-
zations of equal size that merged into one organization. Of course, the concept of shareholders 
is inapplicable for public organizations, such as university hospitals.ii  
 
2.1.3 Merger motives  
Why do mergers occur? In an increasingly competitive global market, mergers have been and 
continue to be a popular and legitimate way to create rapid growth and to improve competitive 
advantage compared to, for example, organic growth. In the capital markets mergers are justi-
fied by their possibility of quickly creating shareholder value. However, most observers agree 
that mergers are driven by a complex pattern of motives, and that no single explanation suffices 
(Ravenschaft & Scherer, 1987; Trautwein, 1990). In merger prescriptions the most popular jus-
tification for mergers is the possibility of realizing synergies. Synergy is often expressed as the 
“2+2=5” effect, or as “the combined performance that is greater than the sum of its parts” (An-
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soff, 1965). In essence, synergies are described as having a latent value that can only be realized 
when companies merge.  
The literature typically divides synergies into three types (Chatterjee, 1986; Trautwein, 1990): 
(1) Financial synergies that chiefly reduce the cost of capital and also diversify industries 
against various business cycles (i.e. spread of financial risk); (2) Operational synergies that are 
aimed at increasing operational efficiency through shared functions, for example, in purchasing, 
production and distribution; and (3) Monopoly-based synergies that are intended to achieve a 
dominant market position and thereby increase bargaining power.  
 
What does the evidence say? In an ambitious attempt to classify merger motives (into seven 
categories) according to their plausibility and consistency with the evidence, Trautwein (1990) 
concludes that explanations based on the popular efficiency theory (i.e. the above noted “finan-
cial and operational synergies”) and monopoly power (i.e. the above noted “monopoly-based 
synergies”) are less supported by evidence than by other explanations such as managerial em-
pire building. Because merger justifications generally rely on efficiency arguments, he con-
cludes that they are “dangerous guides for participants in merger processes” (Trautwein, 1990: 
283).  
 
2.1.4 Merger outcomes 
In terms of reaching intended merger goals, research consistently shows that mergers lead to 
failure more frequently than to success (see e.g. Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006), by for exam-
ple reducing the value for the shareholders (King et al., 2004). Already in the 1960’s, Kitching 
(1967) reported a pessimistic merger failure rate of 75 per cent and a less pessimistic failure 
rate of 46–50 per cent in his later work from 1974. Later studies from the US report equally 
poor failure rates of 77 per cent (Marks, 1988) although a less pessimistic failure rate of 50 per 
cent  was reported in European studies (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Hunt, 1990). Porter (1987) 
also notes a failure rate of 50 per cent in an often-cited study.  Despite these “high” failure rates, 
mergers are a growing phenomenon, which puzzles and interests many researchers (see review 
by Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006).  
 
2.1.5 Suggested explanations  
So, why do most mergers fail to achieve their targeted goals? Over the years, several possible 
explanations have been offered in the literature. While it is not possible to mention all of them, 
some of the most well-known are noted here. As mentioned (see Section 2.1.3), mergers are not 
always motivated by value-adding motives but rather by non value-adding motives such as 
managerial empire building in many cases (Trautwein, 1990). The principal-agency theory is 
useful in this context since this theory has long recognized that a manager’s interests may di-
verge from those of the firm’s owners, because a manager’s pay, power and prestige typically 
are closely related to the size of the company (Berle & Means, 1932). Consequently, a manager, 
acting in his or her self-interest, may choose to invest company funds in projects that increase 
the size of the company, even though such an increase may not necessarily be profitable for the 
investors or the company as a whole (Mueller, 1969).  
 
In particular, poor organizational fit or a lack of cultural compatibility is frequently cited as the 
main reason for merger failures (e.g. Datta, 1991; Sales & Mirvis, 1984). “Organizational fit” 
refers to “horizontal” differences or tensions between the administrative and cultural practices 
of merging firms and can also refer to personal antagonisms (Ibid.). Research shows that how 
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the management executes its post-merger integration plans including the handling of horizontal 
differences, likely has an important influence on merger outcomes (e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991). 
 
Several researchers recommend managers normative models in order to realize potential syner-
gies (e.g. Kitching, 1967; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). For example, a successful “horizontal” 
integration of top management is proposed as a prerequisite for a subsequent smooth integration 
process further down the organization (e.g. Kotter, 1996; Santala, 1996). The post-merger work 
of management has often been described as a balancing act between actions aimed at achieving 
the merger’s formal goals and actions aimed at minimizing the negative influence on the per-
sonnel. This dichotomy in managerial work is often referred to as the “business side” and the 
“human side” (Larsson, 1990) or as “task integration” and “human integration” (Birkinshaw et 
al., 2000). Several researchers (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) sug-
gest that the most successful integration begins with creating a safe and positive environment 
for the employees – that is, by addressing “the soft” human side of work before addressing “the 
hard” business side.  
 
2.1.6 The case of professional firms 
Researchers agree that large companies (Miller & Cardinal, 1994) and knowledge-intensive 
organizations (Birkinshaw et al., 2000) are more complex and therefore considerably more dif-
ficult to integrate than small companies (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Nahavandi & Malakza-
deh, 1988). For example, a study of mergers between large pharmaceutical companies shows 
that it may take 7 to 10 years before potential synergies start to realize (Birkinshaw et al., 2000).  
 
In particular, research shows that different managerial challenges arise in organizations in 
which the employees provide professional services based on their personal expertise (Green-
wood et al., 1994; Løwendahl, 2005). In professional firms, the management must rely on 
autonomous experts and hence has limited control of the firm’s core activity. As a consequence, 
the employees control the integration tempo to a higher degree than in the traditional industry 
(Empson, 2000, 2001; Greenwood et al., 1994). In fact, research shows that the integration 
process at all organizational levels is highly dependent on the professionals’ trust and willing-
ness to cooperate (see e.g. Empson, 2000, 2001). If the management pressures professionals too 
hard, research shows that the risk is high that they leave the organization, taking valuable 
knowledge with them (hence damaging potential merger synergies). Some researchers even 
recommend that management refrain from taking deliberate planned actions if such actions 
might harm employees’ trust (Graebner, 2004). What matters is that professionals of merging 
firms must first have confidence in each other, which may take some good time (Empson, 2000, 
2001).  
 
Even if the management of professional firms may not steer the integration process, research 
shows that management still can influence the process by placing the merger in a larger context 
that creates true meaning for the professionals. In fact, research shows that the use of “the man-
agement of meaning” (Smircich & Morgan, 1982) can even encourage professionals to sponta-
neously initiate integration across company boundaries (Graebner, 2004), although it may take 
several years before such spontaneous cooperation occurs (Empson, 2000, 2001).  
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2.1.7 General conclusions 
Despite a robust body of data from the private business sector, general conclusions are difficult 
to draw  on why some mergers succeed and others do not. However, the capital market school 
has been able to produce some key consistent findings from over 40 years of research. These 
general findings are summarized here:   
 
Waves in merger activity: Today there is a broad consensus in the scientific community that 
mergers occur in waves. Since the first report on merger waves (Nelson, 1959), many studies 
have reported a wave-like pattern in merger activity. Technically, this means that aggregate 
merger series are characterized by “large” bursts of activity separated by lengthy intervals of 
very low activity or extreme swings back and forth between low and high levels of merger ac-
tivity during a certain time period (Gärtner & Halbheer, 2009). In the financial literature, em-
pirical evidence on the time series structure of aggregate merger activity in the US economy has 
attracted considerable attention, particularly the merger waves in the mid-1980s (Golbe & 
White, 1988)iii and the mid-1990s (Harford, 2005)iv.  
 
Target firm gains: Early as well as recent research consistently shows that, on average, share-
holders of target firms earn significant gains while shareholders of acquiring firms neither gain 
nor lose (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000; King et al., 2004). US studies show that shareholders of the 
target firm gain between 20 and 30 per cent, whereas shareholders of the acquiring firm, gain 
only between 0 and 4 per cent (Jarrell et al., 1988). Similar findings are reported in other coun-
tries (Haspelagh & Jemison, 1991).  
 
High-risk strategy: Over the years, there has been little change in merger failure rates (50-75 
per cent). As a result, there is a solid consensus among researchers from various disciplines that 
most mergers fail to achieve their intended outcomes and therefore is considered as a high-risk 
strategy (for more details, see reviews by Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006 and Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991). The current dominant view among merger researchers is therefore that merger 
as a way to create corporate value de facto is a high-risk strategy that at best lead to short term 
value creation for target firms, and, at worst, are almost a sure way to lose money.  
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2.2 MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE  
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Starting in the 1980s, extensive waves of hospital mergers occurred at a record pace, which in-
creased the storms of an already uncertain health care environment. Matching this was a re-
search wave of activity among scientists, industry experts, and consultants studying horizon-
tally and vertically integrated organizations (Burns & Thorpe, 1993; Shortell et al., 1994). As 
with industrial merger research, most of the health care research comes from the US, where 
hospital mergers have a longer history. In Europe, the UK has contributed the largest share of 
research (see the review by Goddard & Ferguson, 1997). Although merger research in health 
care has existed for a significantly shorter time than in the traditional industry, a sufficient 
number of studies have been made that reveal a complex puzzle of multi-dimensional pieces of 
causes and consequences. Yet several efforts have been made to identify patterns of consistency 
and inconsistency in the health care restructuring literature (see e.g. Bazzoli et al., 2004; God-
dard & Ferguson, 1997). Among these, Bazzoli et al.’s (2004) comprehensive review deserves 
extra attention because it focuses simultaneously on motives, context, process and the outcomes 
of mergers that coincide with the aspects of special interest to this study. v This section presents 
major findings reported by this review in combination with other key studies of mergers in 
health care (e.g. Fulop et al., 2002, 2005).  
 
2.2.2 Merger motives 
A general assessment of the literature shows that hospitals typically justify mergers by promis-
ing dramatic increase in financial and operational efficiency (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Goddard & 
Ferguson, 1997). For example, Bazzoli et al. (2004) find that stated merger motives are: im-
proving organizational efficiency, financial performance, long-term survival, community ac-
countability, and patient outcomes. Fulop et al. (2002, 2005) mention economic gains, reduc-
tion of excess capacity to treat patients and increased effectiveness in certain clinical specialties 
(as the amount of activity increases) as typical merger arguments. Both Bogue et al.’s (1995) 
study of hospital mergers in the 1980s and Bazzoli et al.’s (2004) study of hospital mergers in 
the 1990s find that the three primary anticipated merger benefits were: (1) to strengthen finan-
cial performance, (2) to consolidate services and (3) to achieve operating efficiencies. More-
over, in the 1990s large hospitals merged with each other rather than with small and weak hos-
pitals to increase market power in order to better fend off managed care and other environ-
mental pressures (Alexander & Morrisey, 1988; Eberhardt, 2001; Lesser & Brewster, 2001). 
Overall, previous research suggests that hospital mergers primarily are driven by cost effi-
ciency-generating or revenue-enhancing motives.  
 
However, when we look more closely at the literature, we can see some important variations. 
While anticipated financial efficiency emerge repeatedly as the key driver, studies of public 
sector hospitals show that political drivers may also be key merger motives (Denis et al., 1992; 
Fulop et al., 2002). Political drivers for mergers may include facilitating hospital closures and 
ensuring increased negotiating power for health care providers (Fulop et al., 2002). For exam-
ple, Denis et al., (1992) show in a pre-merger study of two public hospitals in Canada (includ-
ing one university hospital) that politics was a key determinant of the merger decision. Hence, 
they conclude that hospital mergers in the public sector do not necessarily result from efficiency 
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motives. In the UK, Fulop et al., (2002: 1) also point out that mergers of the NHS trusts “have 
often been contentious politically”, resulting in the formation of independent panels to “take out 
the politics” in merger decisions. Yet they find that important merger motives included unstated 
drivers (e.g. the need to respond to lobbying from political stakeholders) as well as stated driv-
ers (e.g. the need to make internal savings) (Ibid.).  
 
2.2.3 Merger outcomes 
In terms of outcomes, Lynk (1995) shows that consolidation of hospital departments could re-
sult in greater financial predictability and lower peak load staffing due to reductions in the vari-
ability of demand. Wicks et al., (1998) conducted case studies of hospital mergers and conclude 
that operational efficiencies could be generated through consolidating key administrative func-
tions, eliminating service duplication, closure or conversion of underused inpatient capacity, 
and exploiting economics of scale. Other researchers have focused not only on the potential 
monetary costs of implementing change, but also on the toll on organizations as they respond to 
challenges and potential resistance, which show a post-merger decline in efficiency (Dranove et 
al., 1996; Fulop et al., 2002, 2005; McClenahan, 1999). Taken together, the efficiency outcome 
after hospital mergers is rather mixed.  
 
The only study Bazzoli et al., (2004) found that looks beyond financial effects of hospital con-
solidation and integration is a study by Ho and Hamilton (2000) who examine whether quality 
of care changed when hospitals merged. They find no quality improvements resulting from hos-
pital consolidation and limited evidence of quality deterioration on a few indicators. Fulop et 
al., (2002, 2005) find that the loss of managerial focus had a negative effect on delivery of 
health services. There has also been considerable interest in whether improved health care qual-
ity outcomes can be gained from concentrating the hospital care through mergers. For example, 
Williams et al. (2006) find  that hospital concentration decreased hospital quality while hospital 
competition increased it. Sowden et al. (1997) conclude that there is no good evidence to indi-
cate that increasing volume will result in improvements in quality outcomes when quality is 
associated with volume, 
 
These findings contrast with a study that took a “patient safety” approach to the integration of 
two hospitals (Gering et al., 2005). The authors conclude that patient care is not disrupted and 
that post-integration data show that performance remained constant or improved for the prede-
fined measures of access and quality. Overall previous findings on quality outcomes are mixed. 
The difficulty of defining and agreeing on quality measures (highly disputed) seem not only to 
have produced mixed findings, but also to have limited research on quality outcomes after 
mergers (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Sowden et al., 1997). 
 
2.2.4 Suggested explanations 
Previous research suggests that the hospitals are usually able to consolidate and integrate ad-
ministrative functions, but clinical integration is harder to achieve. One explanation is that roles, 
responsibilities, and lines of authority are clear in administrative hierarchies, which makes it 
straightforward to identify duplicative functions and rationalize administration (Bazzoli et al., 
2004). Research posits that these facilitating factors are not present in clinical structures, which 
makes clinical integration much more complex (Ibid.).  
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Research also points to the obstructive role medical professionals take by altering the pace of 
integration (Ibid.). Fulop et al., (2002, 2005) largely attribute delays in clinical integration to 
those in leadership positions who fail to anticipate the disruptive effects on clinical staff. Over-
all, researchers agree that integration of clinical departments requires time to build trust, to ob-
tain buy-ins, and to deal with resistance from the medical professionals (Bazzoli et al., 2004). 
 
Another explanation for “dysfunctional outcomes” of hospital mergers is offered from an insti-
tutional perspective. Within this thought school, researchers assert that the logic of market-
managerialism (e.g. NPM) has increasingly gained influence in the public sector through mana-
gerial innovations such as mergers (see e.g. Ferlie, 1997; Kitchener & Gask, 2003). Hence, 
leading institutional scholars largely attribute merger failures to the conflict between market-
managerialism and medical professionalism inherent in health care. Deeply embedded profes-
sional structures combined with multiple dominant coalitions of stakeholders in governmental 
sectors (i.e. conflicting agendas of politicians, unions, media, patients) make mergers and other 
examples of radical change attempts such as BPR (Hammer & Champy, 1993) are not only ex-
tremely difficult to effect (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004), but also ill-suited in public health 
care (Cooper et al., 2006; Kitchener, 2002).  
 
Even if various explanations have been suggested for the high rate of hospital merger failures, a 
vast majority of previous research attributes the main obstacle for bringing hospitals together to 
the horizontal differences between the merging organizations (see e.g. Fulop et al., 2002: 5). 
For example, the tendency for one management team to dominate the other is mentioned as an 
early  “horizontal” tension that may impede intended change at later stages (Cohen & Jennings, 
2005; Fulop et al., 2002; Kastor, 2003).  
 
 
2.2.5 The case of university hospitals 
 
Introduction 
Mergers of university hospitals have historically been relatively rare within the health care sec-
tor. However, during the 1990s, several leading university hospitals in the US merged (Kastor, 
2003, 2010a, b). In Sweden, three high profile university hospital mergers occurred in the first 
decade of the 2000s. Apart from two reports on the Sahlgrenska University Hospital merger 
(Brorström, 2004; Hallin, 2000), there is no Swedish research available on university hospital 
mergers. Because most of the research comes from North America, findings summarized here 
largely originate from this scarce pool of research.  
 
Merger motives 
A review of the research clearly shows that bottom-line economics and not medical or quality 
concerns drove university hospital mergers in North America (Kastor, 2003, 2010a, b; Mallon, 
2003; Pellegrini, 2001). For example, Kastor (2003, 2010a, b) observes that income did not 
match expenses, and the hope was that hospital income would rise or at least not decline further 
through mergers. Although the potential to compensate for internal shortcomings inspired many 
of the merger makers, Kastor (2003) claims that university hospitals consolidated to build up 
market power. Overall, US mergers seem to have followed an industrial model driven by in-
creasing financial and market pressure just as at non-academic hospitals (Kastor, 2003, 2010a, 
b; Mallon, 2003; Pellegrini, 2001). In contrast, Swedish studies of a merger including one uni-
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versity hospital (the Sahlgrenska University Hospital merger) report that an additional stated 
merger motive in parallel with increased economic efficiency was to optimize conditions for 
research and education that would strengthen the academic mission (Brorström, 2004; Hallin, 
2000). Kitchener (2002) offers yet an alternative motive. By studying the field of university 
hospitals including an in-depth case study of the failed merger attempt of UCSF/Stanford (dis-
solved on 1 April 2000), Kitchener (2002) suggests that as part of the political agenda to repress 
the prevailing institutional logic of professionalism, executives are expected to uncritically 
adopt certain managerial innovations, such as mergers, to maintain organizational legitimacy.  
 
Merger outcomes 
Kastor has reported on four mergers involving eight university hospitals in the US with differ-
ent outcomes (Kastor, 2003, 2010a, b). From an economic point of view (i.e. stated motive), he 
concludes that two mergers are qualified successes (“Partners” in Boston and “New York - 
Presbyterian Hospital” in New York) and two are failures (“UCSF-Stanford” in California and 
“Mount Sinai-NYU Health” in New York) that resulted in dissolution of the mergers (i.e. legal 
separation) (Ibid.). As one interviewee stated: “The merger took two integrated functioning en-
tities and converted them into three dysfunctional entities” (Kastor 2010b: 1831). In addition to 
these cases, the merger between North Shore Health System and Long Island Jewish Health 
System is considered “a very strong successful merger” (Cohen & Jennings, 2005: 178), 
whereas the merger between Penn State University and Geisinger Health System was a failed 
merger resulting in dissolution two and a half years after the announcement (Mallon, 2003; 
Pellegrini, 2001). In the case of the Sahlgrenska University Hospital merger in Sweden, loss of 
cost control and existing economic problems were still reported six years after the formal 
merger announcement (Brorström, 2004). Research generally shows that rapid consolidation of 
nonclinical departments (i.e. administrative functions) with single leadership appointments 
were achieved early on, but that clinical integration stalled (Cohen & Jennings, 2005; Kastor, 
2003). In addition, Kastor  (2003) also find considerable integration of educational activities in 
successfully merging hospitals. In sum, the motives and outcomes of university hospital merg-
ers reported in the past are mixed.  
 
Suggested explanations 
So, how do these scholars explain outcomes of university hospital mergers, and do these differ 
from mergers of “ordinary” hospital? Some researchers claim early and escalating financial 
losses contribute to the dissolution and the failure of mergers (Kastor, 2010b; Mallon, 2003; 
Pellegrini, 2001). Kitchener (2002: 392), however, agrees with Staw and Epstein (2000) stating 
that dysfunctional outcomes may arise “when executives jump on bandwagons to adopt certain 
merger myths uncritically”. He argues that against the basis of market-managerialism, powerful 
change agents (e.g. the popular business press, business leaders, business schools, the manage-
ment consultant industry) have promoted mergers so successfully that they have achieved 
mythical attributes (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This, he argues, explains why the intended out-
comes of merger rarely emerge when managerial innovations are “sedimented” (Cooper et al. 
1996) uncritically upon the enduring structures of professionalism.     
 
Kastor (2003) also notes that the conflict between economic, medical and academic logics can 
pose obstacles to successful integration. However, in a more recent study, Kastor (2010b) at-
tributes the main reason for university hospital merger failure (such as Mount Sinai-NYU 
Health System and UCSF/Stanford) to the “horizontal” tensions, clashes and oppositions exist-
ing at different levels of the faculties, medical school, senior leadership and trustees of the 
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merging organizations. His focus on horizontal differences is in line with a review of over a 
dozen university hospital mergers where each merger included at least one AHC (Cohen & 
Jennings, 2005). Cohen and Jennings (2005: 176) even suggest “perhaps the dominant reason 
for merger failure is cultural incompatibility between the two organizations” (see also Shaw, 
2003). Again, the horizontal tension as the main explanation for university hospital merger fail-
ures does not differ from those found in the general merger and health care literature.  
 
2.2.6 General conclusions 
Overall, the evidence on merger outcomes from hospital mergers seems mixed, patchy and 
even contradictory. However, Bazzoli et al. (2004) note that although studies of the effects of 
horizontal hospital mergers seem to yield a mix of findings, a closer look reveals that some key 
results have been fairly consistent. These more general findings reported from an extensive re-
view of twenty years of hospital restructuring together with short comments on related articles 
are presented next.  
 
Initial and quick consolidation of administration: Studies by Bazzoli et al. (2002) and case 
studies by Lesser and Brewster (2001) found successful consolidation of administrative func-
tions (e.g. financial management, human resources, managed care contracting, administrative 
practices, strategic planning, and quality assurance functions) among horizontally merged hos-
pitals. Consistent with these studies, Eberhardt (2001) and Wicks et al. (1998) found that ad-
ministrative functions were consolidated by merging hospitals, and that these actions typically 
occurred quickly.  
 
Obstacles when integrating clinical services: With the consolidation of the administration com-
pleted, the hospitals studied by Eberhardt (2001) focused on consolidating patient support func-
tions and low-volume clinical services. This, too, succeeded without much difficulty, but the 
hospitals stumbled with the next step, namely, wide-scale clinical service consolidation and the 
closure of one of the merging hospitals. These studies are consistent with Fulop et al.’s (2002, 
2005) findings that senior management had underestimated the timescale and effort required for 
the merger (service developments were delayed by at least 18 months). Although Shortell et al. 
(1994) have suggested that quick consolidation of administration (i.e. “small wins”) may pro-
vide the basis for dealing with tougher issues at a later point (i.e. more complex clinical integra-
tion), the studies noted above provide little support for this view. 
 
Full mergers lead to cost savings: If one were to look at studies that examine only fully merged 
hospitals (i.e. legal mergers under one license and owner) and not include those with multi-
hospital affiliations, one would observe more consistency in results. Namely, several studies on 
full mergers per se have achieved positive cost savings (Alexander et al., 1996; Connor et al., 
1998; Dranove, 1998; Eberhardt, 2001; Lesser & Brewster, 2001). All studies that have found 
no costs savings or cost increases examined multi-hospital arrangements (Dranove et al., 1996). 
Recent research by Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) specifically contrasted cost changes after 
mergers with cost changes after system affiliation; their results confirm once again that full 
mergers lead to cost savings, while loose system affiliations do not. 
 
Limited and minimal cost savings: Although it may be tempting to conclude that full asset mer-
gers are essential for achieving at least some cost savings from hospital mergers, the results of 
these studies indicate that cost savings from full mergers are quite limited. They tend to be 
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small (Connor et al., 1998; Lesser & Brewster, 2001), may simply represent movements away 
from prior inefficiency (Alexander et al., 1996), are limited to smaller hospitals and are quickly 
exhausted (Dranove, 1998), largely result from administrative savings (Eberhardt, 2001), and 
may simply be one-shot savings rather than reductions in rates of cost growth (for further de-
tails, see the review by Bazzoli et al., 2004).  
 
With financial motives, high failure rate and the horizontal tension as the main outcome expla-
nation, we can clearly see that the literature on health care mergers (including the case of uni-
versity hospitals) does not differ fundamentally from the traditional merger literature. In par-
ticular, it largely agrees with the merger literature on professional service firms.  
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2.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MERGERS 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, the phenomenon of mergers has attracted the research interest from a broad 
range of disciplines. Within each discipline, significant advances have been made. After more 
than 40 years of research, the area of “mergers” has therefore been firmly established as a dis-
tinct research field (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Schweiger & Walsh, 1990). In this sec-
tion, the dominant theoretical perspectives that have emerged are outlined using Haspeslagh 
and Jemison’s (1991) well-cited categories: 1) the capital markets school, 2) the strategy 
school), 3) the organizational behaviour school and 4) the process school. Although all these 
schools concentrate on mergers, each school is rooted in a different elementary research ques-
tions.  
 
2.3.2 The capital markets school  
The capital markets (or financial) school is the oldest school and can be traced back to the early 
1960s. Finance scholars have primarily focused on the issue of whether mergers are wealth cre-
ating or wealth diminishing events for shareholders. The capital markets school is typically in-
terested in mergers’ impact on the financial performance of firms on an aggregate level, meas-
ured as shareholder value. The fundamental question is “Do mergers create value, and if so for 
whom?” (see e.g. Chatterjee, 1986). Researchers in this school perceive value as “shareholder 
value” and value creation as “economic gains for the shareholders”. The methodological ap-
proach used is to study share prices of merging firms during periods surrounding the merger 
announcement. Two continuing research issues within this school are a) how to measure the 
financial performance of a merger and b) the division between the interests of the target firm 
and those of the acquiring firm.  
 
2.3.3 The strategic school 
In the 1980s, the strategic school developed as a response to the fact that the capital markets 
school could not explain merger outcomes, specifically the high number of reported “failed 
mergers” (see Section 2.1.4). Although it has links to the capital markets school, the strategy 
school is more interested in the effect of mergers on the business performance of individual 
firms. The strategy school is primarily concerned with i) finding ways of maximizing profit 
through mergers and ii) avoiding obstacles to this value creation. Researchers in this school are 
guided by two fundamental questions: a) what types of mergers e.g. related, unrelated (see Sec-
tion 1.3.1) are more likely to be successful in terms of improving profit and business perform-
ance? and b) how can one search for and evaluate mergers that have the proper “strategic fit”vi 
for maximizing profit? Hence, researchers in this school are usually divided into two sub-
groups: a) the performance group and b) the planner group. The first subgroup tends to focus 
more on the extent to which a potential target firm is related to a firm’s existing business. The 
second subgroup typically includes academics, consultants and reflective practitioners and is 
therefore more interested in providing firms with practical advice on effective planning (Kitch-
ing, 1967). While little consensus has emerged from this school (King et al., 2004), researchers 
at least agree that mergers’ underperformance cannot be sufficiently accounted for by the 
“goodness of the strategic fit” alone without taking into account the wider integration process.  
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2.3.4 The organizational behaviour school 
The organizational behaviour school (hereafter, the OB-school) developed as a response to the 
inability of ”the capital markets school” or “the strategic school” to explain the high rate of 
merger failure (see Section 2.1.4). This school has often sympathized with employee concerns, 
and has closely examined employee reactions that lead to resistance to change (Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1992; Napier, 1989). With its diverse origins in psychology, organizational behaviour 
and human resource management, researchers in this school have tried to explain merger un-
derperformance in terms of the cumulative dysfunctional impact that the subsequent integration 
process has on individual members of the organization. Thus this school is often said to deal 
with the “soft” aspects of mergers (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). The OB-school can roughly be 
divided into three groups: 1) human resource management researchers, 2) crisis researchers and 
3) culture researchers. The human resource management group focuses on the human problems 
(anxiety, stress, ambiguity, etc.) that employees involved in the post-merger process experience, 
and on ways to prevent or minimize these problems, for example, through extensive communi-
cation (Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). The crisis group views mergers as one example of organ-
izational crisis, whereas the culture group is interested in the cultural compatibility between the 
merging organizations (Buono et al., 1985; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). The OB-school 
typically explains merger failure with poor organizational or culture fitvii (in this thesis, referred 
to as “horizontal”), which has long dominated as one of the main explanations for merger out-
come (see Section 2.1.5). The main goals for this school is to find out i) why problems occur in 
post-merger integration processes and ii) how to avoid such problems in order to meet intended 
goals from a managerial perspective (profit, shareholder value). This growing field of research 
has produced rather mixed and often contradictory results to date (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 
2006).  
 
2.3.5 The process school 
Among the four schools described here, the process school is the newest and the fastest growing 
thought school. Like the other schools, the process school has developed as a response to previ-
ous research’s inability to explain merger outcomes in a satisfactory way. The process school is 
often described as a blend of the strategic school’s emphasis on economic performance on or-
ganizational level (“hard aspects”) and the OB-school’s focus on cultural challenges on indi-
vidual level (“soft aspects”). The process school is mainly concerned with how the processes 
affect merger outcomes. Hence, the link between the merger process and the outcome of that 
process is of main interest (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Process school researchers are also 
concerned with the issue of how the management per se acts to create value in the integration 
process. For example, Seth et al. (2002) observe a number of biases in the process, including 
drawing the wrong analogies, the illusion of control, and the escalation of commitment, by spe-
cifically pointing out “managerial hubris” driving executive post-merger work. Research has 
also shown that the change approach selected by managers may have considerable effect on the 
outcome. For example, a recent longitudinal study of three large, multi-site public sector or-
ganizations shows that an incremental approach is preferred in terms of producing more satis-
factory outcomes for individuals (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006). As in most merger research, 
the process school has found it difficult to draw general conclusions. A possible reason may be 
that mergers seem to be highly context sensitive, which implies that care must be taken when 
generalizing findings from one domain to another (see e.g. Kitchener, 2002; McNulty & Ferlie, 
2002; 2004). 
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2.3.6 Current trends and recent advances 
The merger literature continues to be dominated by the capital markets school, with a high con-
centration of financial studies continuously coming from the US and the UK, although the hu-
man or “soft” aspects of mergers have received more attention in recent years (Cartwright, 
2005). Within the capital markets and strategic schools, much current research deals with the 
identification of the antecedents of the variances in returns for “the acquirers” (see Section 
2.1.7). As an example, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) argue that single hostile bids, despite 
negative press, deliver higher financial returns than other bidder types (such as friendly or mul-
tiple hostile bidders). Within the OB-school, a growing stream of international studies with a 
focus on cultural differences and cross-cultural clashes at national levels can be noted, which 
matches the increase in cross-border mergers (Søderberg & Vaara, 2003). Within the process 
school, a recent study (Teerikangas & Very, 2006) tried to sort out some of the issues on the 
current inconsistency in the research evidence. These authors suggest that more longitudinal 
studies are needed. Cartwright and Schoenberg (2006) note, however, that longitudinal studies 
are rare because it is difficult to maintain representative sample sizes over time, particularly 
because attrition rates are higher than normal in mergers. Because “a huge portion of variance 
remains unexplained” (see Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006: 4) by unspecified variables, exist-
ing knowledge is incomplete in some way, which implies changes to both theory and research 
methods (King et al., 2004: 188).  As guidelines for future opportunities, recent independent 
meta-studies are particularly noteworthy, which conclude that a greater recognition of process-
oriented studies is needed in future merger research (see e.g. King et al., 2004). Leading schol-
ars in the health care management literature, also assert that future research on hospital mergers 
should look at aspects that link the process of change to the outcomes of change if new insights 
are to be made (Bazzoli et al., 2004; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004). 
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3 RATIONALE OF THE THESIS 
 
 
3.1 POSITIONING THE THESIS 
In a direct response to the current call for more process-oriented studies, this thesis is positioned   
within the newest and fastest growing dominant thought school: the process school. In fact, 
leading scholars from various disciplines have identified the merger process as a core issue be-
cause of its indisputable influence on merger outcomes. (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Porter, 
1987; Shrivastava, 1986). Above all, process researchers point out that there are impediments 
embedded in the actual merger process that obscure its complexity and thereby makes it diffi-
cult for managers to take a holistic view of challenges in advance (see e.g. Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986). In other words, leading scholars of the process school (e.g. Greenwood et al., 1994; 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002) criticize and question other schools' assump-
tion that management has the ability to anticipate and handle relevant strategic and organiza-
tional differences (see Section 2.3.3). In essence, the process school takes the critical and com-
plex link between process and outcome as its point of departure (see also Section 2.3.5). Within 
the health care restructuring literature, very few merger studies have examined the link between 
process and outcome (Bazzoli et al., 2004). To complement current merger literature, this thesis 
devotes considerable attention to the pre- and post-merger processes in order to identify and 
better understand the critical factors that may affect the process development and outcome of 
hospital mergers. 
 
 
3.2 GENERAL AIM 
Although the process school is the latest significant theoretical school to produce a substantial 
amount of research, there is still little knowledge on the merger processes in large and complex 
organizations, especially in professionalized, public service settings such as health care. Fur-
thermore, the literature emphasizes that integration is an organizational issue that must be dealt 
with at all organizational levels if the full effect is to be realized (Shrivastava, 1986). Still, stud-
ies of hospital mergers that deal with all the organizational levels are rare. This thesis fills iden-
tified knowledge gap by addressing and linking all organizational levels i.e. from the political 
decision level, executive management and clinical management levels to the clinical staff level. 
In addition, unlike most other merger studies, this thesis explores both pre- and post-merger 
processes. Therefore, the general aim of this thesis is as follows: 
  
To explore a merger of two university hospitals, and thereby to add to the limited stock of em-
pirical research on merger processes in public sector health care. The theoretical aim is to in-
crease the understanding of the pitfalls and possibilities in merger processes at large and com-
plex organizations, especially in professionalized, public service settings.   
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3.3 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
 
3.3.1 Rationale of Study I 
Several researchers have recognized the pre-merger process as a potentially important determi-
nant of merger outcomes (Denis et al., 1992; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986; Trautwein, 1990). For example, research shows that inappropriate decision-making and 
negotiation in the early phases of merger processes can lead to inferior merger outcomes (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) report that management’s efforts to justify merg-
ers in the pre-merger process tend to produce a simplified picture of merger motives. This in 
turn can lead to problems when conditions change in the post-merger integration process, for 
example, with the introduction of new key players. However, a stronger research interest in the 
consequences of mergers than in their antecedents has meant that relatively little attention has 
been paid to pre-merger processes and merger motives even though motives may explain why 
mergers occur (Trautwein, 1990). Research shows that the classic merger motive based on the 
efficiency theory is insufficient as an explanation of the integration process and its outcome. 
Therefore it is recommended that merger research should be redirected toward explanations that 
build on decision-making processes and conflicting goals in the pre-merger process (Denis et 
al., 1992; Trautwein, 1990). 
 
The relationship between the pre-merger process and the post-merger process is, given its im-
portance, understudied. Most researchers in the process school focus on the post-merger inte-
gration process. This focus leaves the pre-merger decision-making process in a scientific “blind 
spot”, which is even more evident in health care. In order to fill this knowledge gap, the first 
study places the pre-merger decision-making process at the centre. The objective of this study is 
as follows:  
  
To examine how and why a decision to merge two university hospitals might occur in a public 
sector context. 
 
 
3.3.2 Rationale of Study II 
An imperative finding within the process school is the importance of top management for the 
outcome and success of the post-merger process (see e.g. Finkelstein, 1999; Kitching, 1967; 
Larsson, 1990). Larsson (1990) further argues that management’s post-merger work is empiri-
cally distinguishable from other organizational phenomena. For example, research shows that 
successful integration of an entire organization requires first a successful horizontal integration 
of the top management group (Santala, 1996). Other researchers suggest that “managerial hu-
bris”viii (Seth et al., 2002) may contribute to failed mergers. Such hubris may prohibit a holistic 
view of the organization and a realistic identification of relevant differences (Ibid.). Taken to-
gether, process researchers agree that it is extremely important to study top management’s ac-
tions and handling of the post-merger integration process as a way to better understand critical 
factors that may facilitate or obstruct intended success of mergers.  
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Despite the fundamental role top management plays in the development and outcome of post-
merger processes, few merger studies look specifically at the role and work of the top manage-
ment group (Schriber, 2008). This research gap is even more evident in public sector health 
care. In order to fill this gap, the second study places top management’s post-merger work at 
the centre. The objective of this study is as follows:    
 
To examine top management’s work in implementing mergers defined as radical change initia-
tives. 
 
 
3.3.3 Rationale of Study III 
An important observation of the process school is the importance of the operational manage-
ment (i.e. the clinical management in the health care context) to the outcome of the integration 
process. For example, some studies suggest that change programs presented as radical depar-
tures often flounder because they are improperly framed by top management (Pondy & Hoff, 
1988; Reger et al., 1994), but that even inappropriately framed change initiatives still can guide 
an organization if managed correctly by operational middle managers (Bamford & Forrester, 
2003). Thus, it is essential to also examine how clinical management deals with the post-merger 
integration process if we are to understand critical factors that may advance or obstruct the 
achievement of intended goals following a hospital merger. 
 
It is not self-evident, however, that management alone has a central role in the post-merger in-
tegration process. In professional service firms (see Section 2.1.6), merger research clearly 
points out that employees are critical to the development and outcome of integration processes 
(Empson, 2000, 2001; Greenwood et al., 1994; Löwstedt et al., 2003). Particularly in health 
care, it has been shown that professionals typically initiate/obstruct and control the pace and the 
direction of the integration process (see e.g. Fulop et al., 2002, 2005). Although professional 
organizations have unique characteristics that distinguish them from manufacturing companies 
in the traditional industry, merger researchers have largely neglected them (Löwstedt et al., 
2003). 
 
In addition, it is (obviously) important to study the consequences for clinical units in order to 
better understand why hospital mergers may succeed or fail. Still, most research on university 
hospital mergers largely focuses on the hospital as the unit of analysis (Kastor, 2003; Kitchener, 
2002). This focus means that the integration process of clinical departments has not been ade-
quately studied. To better understand the critical factors that may help or hinder clinical integra-
tion following a hospital merger, the third study focuses on clinical integration processes. The 
objective of the last study is as follows: 
 
To examine clinical management’s efforts to integrate clinical units following a hospital mer-
ger. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 STUDY DESIGN 
 
4.1.1 Why a case study design? 
Case studies have become one of the most common ways to do qualitative inquiry and are typi-
cally recommended as “the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenome-
non within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003: 1). Such was the case of this research project. 
The case study design is also suitable when the focus is on describing the history of a past phe-
nomenon and/or on understanding processes not yet thoroughly researched (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Leonard-Barton, 1990). The phenomenon of interest for this study was the pre- and post-merger 
processes of large and complex organizations. 
 
4.1.2 Why the Karolinska University Hospital merger? 
Since case studies allow researchers to identify holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-
life events, the need for a single overarching case study arose early in the research planning 
process. Given the desire to understand how and why real change processes evolve in large and 
complex organizations, the flagship merger of two publicly funded university hospitals in 
Stockholm, Sweden - the Karolinska Hospital and the Huddinge University Hospital - seemed a 
“purposive” way to study the phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1994). For several reasons, this 
merger is a highly interesting case that provides a substantively and theoretically critical exam-
ple.  
 
Firstly, in the field of health care, university hospital units and services are organized in large 
and complex systems in which many decisions are implemented across organizational bounda-
ries and across occupational and professional groupings. Secondly, within this field, university 
hospitals represent a more highly complex organization than, for example, “ordinary” hospitals 
and traditional companies (Goldsmith, 1999). One reason is that university hospitals are em-
bedded within multiple institutionalized fields that are constituted by competing sets of rules 
and norms concerning how participants should operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kitchener, 
2002). Thirdly, mergers represent a case of an extremely difficult change process in which mul-
tiple factors may cause failure more often than success (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; 
Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006).  
 
Hence, an analysis of a merger of university hospitals within its real-life context would permit 
an in-depth exploration of the attempt to implement a highly complex change process in a 
highly complex change context (i.e. professionalized, public service settings). The analysis of 
such a merger in a field with “deep layers of competing institutional logics” would also provide 
a rare opportunity to examine a merger as a case of a radical change attempt similar to other 
radical restructuring tools applied in health care, such as Business Process Re-engineering 
(Hammer & Champy, 1993; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004). Finally, a single case design is 
eminently justified when the case represents an extreme/unique case or rare circumstance (Yin, 
2003). For all these reasons, the case of the KUH merger was considered an excellent choice for 
the research purpose of this thesis.  
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4.1.3 Embedded case study design 
Single cases are a common case study design. Yin (2003) describes two variants: those using 
the holistic design and those using embedded units of analysis. A typical problem with the ho-
listic design is that the entire case study may be conducted at an abstract level, where opera-
tional detail of the phenomena is lacking. On the other hand, a major concern with embedded 
design is that the case study focuses only on the subunit level and fails to return to the larger 
unit of analysis. To extend the analysis, and thereby to enhance potential insights into the single 
case, this thesis uses the embedded design, which is the more complex variant of single case 
design. This means that several units of analysis were involved. The main unit is the hospital 
organization (represented by the executive management and the board) within a larger change 
context (represented by the regional government and the medical university), with the clinical 
departments as the smallest unit of analysis (represented by clinical managers and clinical staff 
members). Following literature’s guidelines for sampling embedded cases, two embedded cases 
of clinical integration process were chosen based on maximum variation on the outcome vari-
able (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000)ix. Each case represents two formally merged clinical depart-
ments (four clinical departments in total) of the same clinical speciality from each hospital site 
pre-merger (i.e. KH and HUH).  
 
 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
 
4.2.1 Interviews 
Because the interview is considered one of the most important sources of case study informa-
tion (Yin, 2003), interviews were used as the main data source for the three studies in this the-
sis. When existing theory or literature on the phenomenon studied is limited, interviews with 
open-ended questions are highly recommended (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) rather than questions 
derived from a pre-existing theory. Following the strong recommendation to conduct guided 
conversations with a fluid stream of questions rather than rigidly structured queries (Rubin & 
Rubin, 1995), open-ended interviews were conducted instead of working from a predetermined 
list of questions. This meant that a core set of questions, with the overarching topic of “the mer-
ger” was posed to all respondents. Other questions, not specified in advance, were only asked if 
they seemed useful (Ibid.).  
 
This approach meant that the interviewer had two jobs throughout the interview session: (a) to 
follow the line of inquiry, as reflected by the case study protocol, and (b) simultaneously to 
pose non-threatening questions that would elicit unbiased answers. This approach also allowed 
the collection of rich descriptions and concrete stories about organizational life, which 
Czarniawska (1997) argues is important for capturing and understanding the uncharted territo-
ries of organizational phenomena, such as in this case. Quotations from the interviews are 
mainly used in the thesis to illustrate important findings and to give the reader a direct link to 
the rich raw data on which the analysis rests. According to Yin (2003), respondents may also 
suggest other persons to interview, as well as point to other sources of evidence (e.g. docu-
ments). The more a respondent assists in this manner, the more the role may be considered one 
of an “informant” rather than a respondent (Yin, 2003). For example, the initial sample of inter-
view respondents in Study I, suggested other key people who had insights into or had partici-
   23 
pated in the pre-merger process. These interviewees are accordingly identified as “key infor-
mants” in Study I. Each interview generally lasted between one and two hours. The same inter-
viewer (the thesis author) conducted all interviews in face-to-face meetings in the interviewees’ 
natural work settings. In total, 57 individuals were interviewed. 
 
 
4.2.2 Documents 
According to the methodology literature, documentary information is relevant to every case 
study topic (Yin, 2003). Numerous documents were therefore collected for all three studies. 
These were public documents (annual reports, meeting minutes, questionnaires/surveys, public 
inquiries, budget data, media reports, web pages, announcements, progress reports, newsletters, 
etc.) and non-public documents (notes, performance measures, memoranda, letters, internal 
presentations, decision-making data, e-mail messages, etc.). Documents must be carefully 
treated in the research process since they may not always be accurate (e.g. newspaper articles). 
Therefore particular care was taken in the interpretation of the documentary evidence in order 
to make certain that it was not prepared for some specific purpose (other than this research). 
Documentary data is particularly essential for retrospective reconstruction of the case history of 
a past phenomenon such as in Study I. Documents also help to verify key information ex-
pressed in individual interviews such as financial performance, formal goals and outcomes as 
well as the organizational structure, vision and strategic plans, etc. In fact, Yin (2003) claims 
that in case studies the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evi-
dence from other sources (i.e. triangulation). 
  
 
4.2.3 Observations 
Observational evidence often provides useful additional information about relevant behaviours 
or environmental conditions, especially if the phenomena of interest are not purely historical. 
An essential requirement is that the observations take place in natural settings and not in ex-
perimental ones. Because the interest of Study II was to examine the work and dynamics of ex-
ecutive management in real-life, several field visits were made to the relevant site. Specifically, 
the investigator (the thesis author) participated in top management’s weekly meetings and 
lunches during 2005 and 2006. This observation was of a non-participant nature because par-
ticipant-observation may produce potential biases (see Becker, 1958). Also, the observer may 
lack the time to take notes and the opportunity to work as an external observer, as a good ob-
server must. A direct non-participant who watches and records the top management in action 
obtains important data on several topics such as group dynamics and the handling of unex-
pected managerial challenges (e.g. in this research, the reluctant dismissal of a clinical Direc-
tor). These observations were also useful in verifying opinions expressed at individual inter-
views about management’s work logic and the progress of the post-merger process. When ana-
lysing managerial work, it is important to balance what people say they do (espoused behav-
iour) in individual interviews against what they actually do (observed behaviour). The observa-
tions permitted the recording of actual behaviour rather than espoused beliefs.x In total, 24 
hours of top management meetings were observed (Study II). In addition, some observational 
data from informal sessions (e.g. lunches and breaks) were also collected.  
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4.2.4 Time period 
Overall, retrospective data (Study I) as well as data in real time (Studies II and III) were col-
lected across the organization as a whole (Study I and II) and from the clinical departments in-
cluded in the two embedded cases (Study III). Taking the studies together, this thesis reports on 
the pre- and post-merger processes of the KUH merger between the years of 1995 and 2007. 
Collection of research data was concentrated to 2004 and 2007, which covered the three-year 
period the regional government gave the top management to fulfil their formal merger assign-
ment. This period also coincided with the duration of the top management group analyzed in 
Study II. In 2010, Study III was complemented with data to get long-term indications on the 
clinical integration status six years post-merger.  
 
 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.3.1 Data structuring  
For the three studies, a specific step-by-step procedure was used to structure the empirical data. 
This process is briefly described next. xi Firstly, a research assistant transcribed the interviews 
that had been recorded on digital audiotapes (into Word files), which were then exported to a 
database using the Qualitative Research Software “NVivo 7.0”. The thesis author read the in-
terviews and the documents iteratively to obtain a sense of the whole (Tesch, 1990). Secondly, 
the data were read word by word to derive themes. This was done by first highlighting the exact 
words from the text that appeared to capture key thoughts or concepts, and then by analysing 
the first impressions. Thirdly, this process continued by assigning labels to themes that reflected 
more than one key thought or concept. These came directly from the text and became the initial 
coding scheme. Finally, a tree diagram was developed in NVivo 7.0 to help organize these 
categories into a hierarchical structure. To address the internal validity of the data, references to 
observational and documentary data were also noted in NVivo 7.0.   
 
 
4.3.2 Pattern identification 
To identify empirical patterns, the data was searched for dominant themes. These were recur-
ring themes that had been mentioned as important and formative to the merger process by sev-
eral respondents and/or stakeholder groups independently of each other. Next, the dominant 
themes identified were coded and mapped into categories and subcategories based on how they 
related to each other. For example, by mapping themes and key events in chronological order 
the case descriptions of the pre- and post merger processes were reconstructed. During the en-
tire process, the themes were iteratively categorized, revised and compared. Finally, the emer-
gent categories were used to organize and group themes into meaningful clusters or patterns 
(Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Patton, 2002). The pattern identification process also involved dis-
cussions with colleagues, who challenged and questioned the emerging themes/patterns in 
working towards agreement (Patton, 2002; Yin, 1999).  
 
Although the identification of empirical patterns followed a similar procedure, one distinguish-
ing aspect should be noted. For Study I and Study III, an inductive or data-driven approach was 
used for the identification process of dominant themes and empirical patterns. This is generally 
recommended when the aim is to describe a phenomenon and existing theory on the phenome-
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non is limited (Hsieh and Shannon, 2002). This means that researchers avoid using precon-
ceived categories, and instead allow the categories and names for the categories to flow from 
the data. For Study II, a combination of a data-driven (induction) and theory-driven (deduction) 
techniques was used (i.e. abduction). The rationale for using an “abductive approach” was the 
pre-existence of substantial amount of relevant literature that we could draw on (whereas the 
phenomena was considered largely unstudied in Study I and Study III). 
 
 
4.3.3 Theoretical interpretation 
The primary purpose for incorporating existing theories in this thesis was to develop a deeper 
understanding of the discovered empirical patterns/themes and also enable theoretical generali-
zation. In Study I, the aim was to find applicable decision theories that might offer possible ex-
planations of the pre-merger decision-making process. However, the search for applicable theo-
ries within the general management literature proved fruitless. Following discussions with col-
leagues, the neo-institutional take on decision logics seemed to be more relevant to interpret the 
empirical findings in Study I. Specifically, by using the neo-institutional concept of action and 
decision rationality, a theoretical explanation of the decision-making process and its outcome 
was allowed. In Study II, a combination of theories from the merger literature, change man-
agement and the neo-institutional concept of radical change was used to interpret and explain 
the patterns of executive work found. In Study III, empirical findings in the two embedded 
cases were discussed and compared against the merger literature as well as a wider body of 
change management literature. Overall, the literature was used to increase the understanding of 
identified empirical patterns and to externally validate the empirical findings (i.e. theoretical 
generalization). This also means that previous research and relevant theories are largely ad-
dressed in the discussion sections of the published articles (see enclosed articles at the end). 
 
 
4.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
In accordance with the Swedish “Ethical Review Act”, ethical application for the research re-
ported in this thesis was submitted to and approved by the regional board in Stockholm (Dia-
rienummer: 2005/875-31). The “Ethical Review Act” applies to research on living people, as 
well as to research on the deceased, human biological material, and sensitive personal informa-
tion. This research did not involve laboratory equipment, biological material or any other sensi-
tive personal information. 
 
The prime research interest was of organizational nature (i.e. merger processes). Hence the in-
terviewees were asked questions regarding “the merger” as the overarching theme. Moreover, 
the interviewees were informed about the objectives and procedures of the interviews in ad-
vance. The voluntary nature of the interviewee participation was emphasized. All interviewees 
gave their informed consent. To protect the anonymity of the interviewees, fictitious names are 
used in the thesis. In the instances where the position of an interviewee is unique and therefore 
might be disclosed, the interviewee gave his or her consent to be featured in the case descrip-
tions.   
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4.4.1 Competing interest 
This study was commissioned and partly funded by the regional government (i.e. the Stock-
holm County Council), which is the owner of the studied hospitals. The study design and all 
research activities were independently created. Observations were reported orally to representa-
tives of the Stockholm County Council on various occasions. All publications are the result of 
an independent research process.  
 
 
Table 1: Methodology Overview 
 
 Study I Study II Study III 
Study design 
Case study - 
Change context 
Case study - 
Holistic organization 
Case study - 
Embedded units 
Phenomenon 
Pre-merger 
decision-making process 
Post-merger 
integration process 
Post-merger 
integration process 
Unit of analysis Regional government Hospital management Clinical department 
Time period 1995 - 2003 2004 - 2007 2004 – 2007 (+2010) 
Data sources 
 
Interviews 
Documents 
 
Interviews 
Documents 
Observations 
 
Interviews 
Documents 
 
No. of interviews 35 22 22 
Data analysis 
Chronological reconstruction 
Manual coding 
Inductive approach 
Chronological reconstruction 
QRS-supported coding 
Abductive approach 
Thematic reconstruction 
QRS-supported coding 
Inductive approach 
Data validation 
Triangulation 
Member checking 
Triangulation 
Member checking 
Triangulation 
Member checking 
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5 FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1 THE THREE STUDIES IN A NUTSHELL 
Study I II III 
Objective To examine how and why a 
decision to merge two univer-
sity hospitals might occur in a 
public sector context.  
To examine top management’s 
work in implementing mergers 
defined as radical change ini-
tiatives. 
To examine clinical manage-
ment’s efforts to integrate clin-
ical units following a hospital 
merger. 
Methodology This study reports from the 
years 1995 to 2003. Based on 
extensive document analysis 
and 35 key informant inter-
views, the pre-merger process 
was reconstructed in order to 
identify empirical patterns, 
which were interpreted by 
applying neo-institutional the-
ory.   
This study reports from the 
years 2004 to 2007. Three 
sources of data collection were 
used: 22 interviews, observa-
tions and documents. An ab-
ductive approach (i.e. themes 
from the data and the litera-
ture) was used to reconstruct 
and analyse executive man-
agement’s post-merger work.  
This study reports from the 
years 2004 to 2007. Based on 
22 interviews with clinical 
staff members from four clin-
ics, two cases of clinical inte-
gration efforts were recon-
structed and compared. The 
results were then discussed 
using the merger and change 
management literature. 
Findings Spanning nearly a decade, the 
pre-merger process developed 
from idea generation through 
transition to formal decision. 
The process took place on the 
scientific and political arenas. 
 
The stated merger motives 
were to enhance research ex-
cellence and to improve eco-
nomic efficiency.  
 
By applying a neo-institutional 
perspective, the study finds 
that the initial phases were 
driven by decision rationality, 
(which is typical in political 
organizations) and that the 
final phase was driven by ac-
tion rationality, which is typi-
cal in private business firms.  
 
Critical factors behind this 
major change of decision logic 
were means convergence that 
united key stakeholder groups, 
and a politico-economic crisis, 
which ultimately legitimized 
the controversial merger deci-
sion.  
 
The study shows that stated 
and/or economic drivers may 
not alone cause merger deci-
sions in the public sector. 
The study describes a linear 
planned top- down approach 
to change in which a series of 
disruptions occur. Hence, the 
study confirms the limitations 
of the classic change strategy 
to explain radical change in 
professional organizations.  
 
An important paradox is iden-
tified: initial managerial suc-
cess seems to impair the 
change process further down 
the organization. This finding 
is contrary to merger litera-
ture’s prescription.  
 
This study confirms that a 
transition to convergent 
change is a more likely out-
come when a radical change 
initiative is attempted in an 
organization embedded in 
deep structures of profession-
alism. 
 
In professionalized settings 
top management appears to be 
limited: to initiate radical 
change and to get the role of a 
scapegoat. The study also 
reveals their difficult role vis-
à-vis multiple stakeholders 
inherent in public sector.  
The study identifies three crit-
ical factors that appear instru-
mental for the process and 
outcome of integration efforts. 
These are clinical manage-
ment’s 1) interpretation of 
institutional pressures 2) de-
sign of management system; 
and 3) approach to change.  
 
Obstructive factors are: 1) an 
unfiltered interpretation of the 
formal mandate from the top; 
2) individual leadership; and 
3) the use of a classic planned, 
top-down approach to change.  
 
Supportive factors are: 1) a re-
interpretation of the formal 
mandate to include competing 
logics; 2) shared leadership in 
a “hybrid system”; and 3) the 
use of a an emergent bottom 
up approach to change within 
planned boundaries.  
 
These findings are basically 
consistent with the merger 
literature’s prescriptions for 
professional organisations.  
 
Originality By taking a pre-merger per-
spective, this study offers a 
rare empirical account of a 
university hospital merger.  
This study contributes to one 
important aspect of managerial 
agency that is rarely discussed 
in the literature. 
This study  adds to the limited 
body of empirical research on 
clinical integration following a 
university hospital merger.  
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5.2 A SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF THE THREE STUDIES 
 
5.2.1 Case context 
Health care in Sweden is the primary responsibility of 21 regional self-governing bodies – 
counties. Each regional population elects its regional assembly – the county council. The coun-
ty levies a proportionate income tax on the population, which is the main source of health care 
funding. The financial contribution of the national government is approximately 10 per cent of 
total health care expenditures, and is typically allocated to health care providers as financial 
incentives to promote national health policy goals such as improving access to care or increas-
ing patient safety. 
 
Higher education is the primary task of national government. Universities, including medical 
schools, are government agencies, funded by the Department of Education. State research 
councils and private foundations award funds for research.  
 
Stockholm County provides health care to a population of about 2 million people in the Stock-
holm region. In the early 1990s the County introduced a “purchaser-provider split”. A health 
care board, composed of politicians who are appointed by the regional parliament, was assisted 
by a secretariat of administrators and medical experts. This board is the purchaser of health 
care. The County owns the health facilities, which are part of the County governance structure. 
 
During the last decade the Stockholm County decision-makers have: opened up the health care 
market, increased competition by privatising County facilities, invited new private providers to 
respond to tenders and, most recently, removed barriers to market entrance and let the “money 
follow the patients” according to the patients’ choices. 
 
At the end of the 1990s the legal status of some County hospitals, including Huddinge Univer-
sity Hospital, was changed. These hospitals became limited companies, entirely owned by the 
County. As limited companies, the hospitals have a more independent position than the directly 
managed hospitals. For instance, the companies have boards of (non-executive) Directors who 
are appointed by the owner (regional government). The board Directors are health care experts 
rather than politicians. 
 
In 2003, both Karolinska Hospital and Huddinge University Hospital were County facilities and 
part of the regional governance structure. Hospital executives were appointed (de facto) by the 
regional government, and decisions concerning investments and infrastructure were made by 
the regional parliament. Huddinge University Hospital had the legal status of a limited com-
pany. However, when the two hospitals merged, the KUH became a directly managed unit. Al-
though a board of non-executive experts was appointed, the board does not have, in real-life, 
the legal rights and responsibilities of a limited company’s board of Directors. 
 
Karolinska Institutet, a government institution that educates physicians and a number of allied 
health care professions, is the major national provider of medical and health-related research, 
Based on national regulation, the Stockholm County and the Karolinska Institutet have signed a 
contract for mutual cooperation in the fields of health education and research. The County re-
ceives financial compensation from the national government for the additional costs of clinical 
education and research that utilise County facilities. A number of bi-partisan committees over-
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see the cooperation. There are no formal organizational links between the Karolinska Institutet 
and the County. 
 
The Stockholm university hospitals have traditionally provided “super specialty” care as well as 
“basic” specialised care in order to meet the needs of clinical education and research. These 
hospitals have had a major role in providing health care services to the population. Table 2 de-
picts some statistics on the size and activity of the hospitals in 2003 (pre-merger) and for the 
merged hospital in 2004 (post-merger) . 
 
Table 2: Key figures of university hospitals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study I: Logics of pre-merger decision-making processes –    
The case of Karolinska University Hospital 
 
Introduction 
On 9 December 2003, the Stockholm County Council took the formal decision to merge Karo-
linska Hospital and Huddinge University Hospital. The merger decision was considered contro-
versial, complex and far from obvious. How could a decision considered “impossible” become 
possible?  
 
Background 
In the merger literature, researchers have recognized the pre-merger decision-making process 
as an important determinant of post-merger process and outcomes. Nevertheless, most of the 
merger research has focused on the post-merger integration process. This stronger interest in 
merger consequences has resulted in modest attention paid to merger antecedents, even though 
they explain why hospital mergers occur and also may shed important light on why most fail. 
As a result, the pre-merger decision-making process is a more or less a scientific “blind spot”, 
particularly in health care. Although general conclusions have been difficult to draw, research 
shows that efficiency arguments continue to dominate contemporary merger prescriptions. Such 
prescriptions, according to several researchers, provide dangerous guides for participants in 
merger processes because they do not provide sufficient explanations for merger outcomes. In-
stead they urge merger research to be redirected to explain drivers and motives arising from 
conflicting goals in the decision-making processes. As a direct response to this call for more 
research on pre-merger processes, this study examines how and why a decision to merge two 
university hospitals might occur in a public sector context.  
 
  KH HUH KUH 
  (2003) (2003) (2004) 
Turnover (€M)  560 455 1030 
Staff  8362 6565 15 393 
Beds  1045 1089 1700 
Visits  845 018 611 962 1400 000 
Discharges  59 998 46 787 104 361 
Year established  1940 1972 2004 
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Methodology 
An in-depth study of the merger between two university hospitals (KH and HUH) in Stock-
holm, Sweden, was used to investigate the pre-merger processes of the KUH merger. The data 
for this study consisted of 35 interviews with individuals representing the formal decision-
making body (the SCC), the merged hospital (KUH), and the affiliated medical university (KI).  
In addition, extensive documents were collected. By identifying key events in chronological 
order, the case history of the pre-merger process was retrospectively reconstructed. Data consis-
tency was cross-checked over different empirical sources (interviews and documents). To seek 
possible explanations of the reconstructed pre-merger process, empirical patterns were inter-
preted using neo-institutional theory.    
 
Case description 
The decision to merge HUH and KH was considered controversial, complex, and historically 
unthinkable for several reasons. First, the rivalry between the professionals at KH and HUH had 
historically been fierce, which had hindered any deeper clinical or research cooperation. Sec-
ond, the conditions for a large restructuring decision in health care were far from optimal, be-
cause SCC had shifted political majority in every election since the early 1970s, which led to a 
repetitive series of short-term reforms and counter-reforms.  
 
In 1995, the newly appointed KI president expressed his concern that this rivalry was damaging 
to the clinical research work and to KI’s position in the international research community.  In 
particular, the area of highly specialized care was considered to receive insufficient research 
resources because KH and HUH competed for the same scarce patients in the Stockholm re-
gion. Inspired by how Johns Hopkins Medicine in the USA had united the three-partite mission 
of university hospitals (clinical care, research and education) under the same umbrella organiza-
tion, the KI president began promoting the merger idea within KI, a vision he called  “Karolin-
ska Medicine”. Because the merger topic was considered taboo, neither the research community 
nor the political community supported the idea for several years. 
 
Following the election in the fall of 2002, after a new political majority took office in the SCC, 
it became evident that there was a significant budget deficit. This situation encouraged the KI 
president to propose the merger to the SCC politicians. It was argued that the merger would 
lead to cost savings as well as strengthen KI’s research position. Still no action was taken.  
 
When the Stockholm Administrative Court (based on an appeal by two citizens) unexpectedly 
rejected the SCC’s unbalanced budget proposal on August 22, 2003, a new budget in balance 
was required “immediately” if the SCC was to avoid falling into “receivership”. As a result, the 
HUH-KH merger idea was revived as a way to provide the largest cost savings in the budget 
proposal. Due to the extra-ordinary circumstances, much of the pre-merger work was prepared 
among few people in closed rooms. Hence, the political opposition claimed that the process was 
not being conducted in a “democratic way”. Although the political opposition made an effort to 
engage the media, stronger emotions from the public rose against the proposal to close two lo-
cal emergency wards. The endangered merger proposal was secured when a political compro-
mise was reached that saved the two emergency wards. The decision to merge HUH and KH 
was taken by the SCC on December 9, 2003. The budget proposal with the merger as the largest 
saving passed by the narrow margin of 73 to 72.  
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Findings and discussion  
The pre-merger process progressed from idea generation (nearly a decade) through transition 
(one year) to a formal decision (three months). The process took place in both the scientific and 
political arenas. The identified motives were to achieve research excellence and to produce 
economic savings. Hence the study identified three phases, two arenas, and two merger mo-
tives. Driven by research excellence, the KI president generated, promoted and tried to anchor 
the merger idea in the scientific community during the first pre-merger phase. During this tran-
sition phase, an economic crisis in the region allowed the president of KI to promote the merger 
idea among the formal decision-makers in the political arena i.e. the SCC. In informal meetings, 
key actors from both the scientific and the political arenas discussed and were united by the 
idea that a merger could be used to achieve both research excellence and economic efficiency. 
However, an unexpected disapproval (verdict) of SCC’s budget proposal triggered a politico-
economic crisis, which reduced the merger benefits to a strict focus on large and quick savings.  
 
From a neo-institutional perspective, the first two phases were driven by decision rationality, 
which is typical for political and academic organizations, whereas the final phase was driven by 
action rationality, which is more typical for private firms. Critical factors behind this fundamen-
tal change of decision logic were an economic crisis and means convergence, which solved 
conflicting goals and united key stakeholder groups. The definitive shift to a “pure” action ra-
tionality was however not completed until a critical incident (the budget disapproval) caused a 
crisis in the political arena, which justified the action rationality driving the last pre-merger 
phase. The findings of two stated merger motives and an unstated political driver, suggest that 
there may be other motives than stated financial arguments for mergers in public health care. 
The finding of research excellence in Swedish studies of university hospital mergers should 
also modify the picture of the financial driver being the sole stated motive as reported by US 
studies.  
 
Implications 
The conclusion is that a change of decision logic from decision rationality to action rationality 
may promote reaching decisions in large and complex issues in a public sector context. Given 
that merger researchers generally point to the pre-merger process as a potential determinant of 
merger decisions, a natural implication for future research would be to study the post-merger 
integration process following the pre-merger process within the same case context.  
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Study II: Executive management in radical change –  
The case of the Karolinska University Hospital merger 
 
Introduction  
In the beginning of 2004, a new top management group took official charge of the newly 
merged KUH. The group immediately began working rapidly and pro-actively to achieve the 
regional government’s change ambition, aiming at substantial cost reductions. However, by 
2006 the group’s motivation and enthusiasm had decreased. Eventually the group withdrew its 
original plan and the Director left the organization. The new Director reduced the management 
group and initiated incremental change projects within an already existing structure. How and 
why did the radical change ambitions turn into an incremental change process? 
 
Background.  
The concept of radical change, or “Big Bang” as it is sometimes evocatively known, covers 
quite dramatic organizational changes – and a merger between two university hospitals clearly 
fits into the kind of restructuring that has the potential to materialize radical change. The role of 
executive management in radical change is however very controversial. Functional theorists 
suggest a classic top-down approach that offers managers prescriptive techniques promising 
transformational change in two to three years. This research stream assigns the individual leader 
a pivotal role, for example, as an authorizer, visionary and motivator. Other scholars highlight 
the critical role that political negotiations between multiple stakeholders play in shaping the 
outcomes of change processes. The classic functional approach has been heavily criticized be-
cause it assumes “linear consequentiality” between top management’s actions and the outcomes 
of the change process. However, an alternative approach largely fails to explain what role top 
management actually plays in real change processes. Thus there is a research need to further 
examine the work and role of executive management in mergers as a proxy of radical change.  
 
Yet there are few studies that examine top management’s post-merger work, particularly in 
health care. To contribute to this limited stock of empirical work, this study examines the work 
and role of executive management in merging two university hospitals. The aim is to shed light 
on critical factors that may advance or obstruct management’s post-merger efforts in public 
sector health care. The objective is to examine top management’s work in implementing merg-
ers defined as radical change initiatives.  
 
Methodology  
This study reports from the period from the beginning of 2004 to the beginning of 2007, which 
covers the timeframe the new top management was given to fulfil the formal merger mission 
i.e. year 2004 to 2006. This three-year period coincided also with the duration of the top man-
agement group analyzed. Data was collected from 2005 to 2007. Interviews were conducted 
with all eighteen members of the new top management group and with four hospital board 
members. Top management meetings were observed on different occasions (24 hours) and nu-
merous public and internal documents were collected in addition. An abductive approach was 
used to analyze the reconstructed case.  
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Case description 
Following the decision to merge HUH and KH, the regional government (SCC) appointed a 
hospital Director who had a career background in private industry. This study describes the se-
ries of management actions and events that occurred in the first three years, where merger is 
seen as a radical change attempt. The new hospital Director recruited a management team who 
was loyal to her and to her managerial approach, which contributed to a strong cohesion within 
the group during the first post-merger year. The Director immediately prioritized handling the 
potential problems that might result from horizontal tension between the two hospital sites by, 
for example, addressing logo and branding issues early on to seek acceptance of a new and uni-
fied hospital. The Board, hired management consultants, the affiliated medical university (KI) 
and the Stockholm County Council expressed their support for the Director’s approach to 
change. Under the “strong” leadership of the Director, the management group was driven by a 
strong focus on mandated cost savings. Due to the rigid deadlines of the merger mission, rapid 
decision-making, closed-door meetings and a perceived high degree of control portrayed the 
group’s working mode. The executive work, which initially focused on internal administrative 
tasks, resulted in a number of “small wins” in which the mandated cost savings for the first year 
were achieved and even exceeded.  
 
After the “jump start” in first year (2004), top management started to work aspects related to the 
clinical departments. The objective was to solidify the commitment to the hospital’s strategy 
and implementation plans among doctors and nurses. However, almost immediately the clinical 
staff voiced their opposition, and the protests quickly spread throughout the entire organization. 
The Director had not anticipated this opposition and, therefore, was frustrated by the amount of 
time required to deal with it in personnel meetings. The situation worsened when several doc-
tors contacted the media as a way to influence and change the management agenda. Without a 
contingency plan, the hospital Director was forced to respond to the media. She felt that the 
staff members who had made their complaints public through the media were deeply disloyal. 
The second year (2005) was described as “total war” between management and staff members. 
The division managers in the group, who all were doctors, became increasingly torn between 
their loyalty to their medical colleagues and professional values on the one hand, and their loy-
alty to the hospital Director and the managerial values on the other. When an emergency clinic 
was threatened with closure, outspoken protests arose among the staff and in the media, causing 
many division managers to question their loyalty to the Director and their merger mission. 
Eventually the management split in two groupings: (1) those with private industry, administra-
tive backgrounds who remained loyal to the Director and the formal mission; and (2) those with 
public sector medical backgrounds who experienced awakened loyalty to their medical col-
leagues and clinical care.  
 
In the beginning of the third post-merger year (2006), the political opposition entered the ongo-
ing battle between the top management and the doctors. With an eye on a general election soon 
coming up, the political opposition publicly criticized the hospital Director for having neglected 
patient care and focused too much on cost savings. As a response to the criticism and the nega-
tive press, the Director declared the third post-merger year a “patient safety year.” Otherwise, 
the top management group grew passive. No new activities, plans or merger-related actions 
were initiated. After a new political majority was elected, the hospital Director was replaced. 
The new hospital Director, physician by training, re-organized parts of the hospital management 
and launched a clinical process improvement initiative by employing a step-by-step approach.  
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Findings and discussion  
In 2004 the new executive management had a “jump start”, when the management team was 
successfully formed with high internal cohesion and the economic goal for the first post-merger 
year was achieved and even exceeded. In the second post-merger year (2005), however, the 
team “hit the wall” as it was challenged by escalating criticism from medical staff. In the begin-
ning of the third year (2006), the top management group “ran out of steam” as members with-
drew, and no new merger activities were introduced. In terms of competing logics, the execu-
tive work was driven by business managerialism in year 1, but got challenged by medical pro-
fessionalism in year 2, and in year 3 medical professionalism superseded business managerial-
ism. A new hospital Director initiated incremental change projects for selected parts of the or-
ganization. Thus, a radical change attempt transformed into convergent change three years post-
merger. 
 
Using change management terminology, the study outlines a classic top-down approach to 
change with a series of unexpected disruptions. The limitations of functional theorists’ linear 
approach to radical change are therefore evident in this case. The study identifies an important 
paradox: contrary to what is predicted by the merger literature, initial managerial success seems 
to impair rather than promote the subsequent change process further down the organization. In 
particular, management fell prey to the conflict between the competing value systems of man-
agerialism and professionalism, which was manifested by the growing tensions with clinical 
staff. A likely explanation for these managerial shortcomings is the high spirit within the group 
that followed the success of the first post-merger year. This, and several other factors (such as 
the strong focus on economic and administrative issues, isolation of management team mem-
bers from their clinical constituencies and surrounding support from external stakeholders), 
may explain why the management’s ability to recognize the complexity of the change context 
and thereby better understand the challenges ahead was diminished. This study confirms that 
“small initial wins” may in fact cause managerial hubris that impairs subsequent post-merger 
work. The study also reveals that even if the managerial agenda has the strong support of deci-
sion makers (i.e. SCC) and other stakeholders (e.g. the Boards, the medical university etc.), op-
posing value system and resistance among professional staff are easily triggered causing radical 
change attempts to stall. Hence the role of top management switches from being initially proac-
tive to becoming reluctantly reactive during the process. Top management is the primary target 
of complaints and criticism and is therefore unwillingly forced into a scapegoat role. Conse-
quently, the emotional and professional costs for senior managers are high, especially for doc-
tors in manager positions (i.e. hybrid professionals). This study confirms that the prospects of 
achieving radical change are very limited due to deep structures of clinical work embedded in 
health care  
 
Implications  
Technological change, increasing market pressures and political programs introducing patient 
choice require health care organizations to adapt and change quickly. As shown earlier, a clas-
sic top-down approach to change seems to have low prospects of accomplishing organizational 
transformation in health care. To avoid the risk of managerial hubris (created by “small wins”), 
top management also needs to recognize the complexity of post-merger processes in settings 
with multiple stakeholders and competing institutional logic, such as in public sector health 
care.  
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Study III: Managing clinical integration –         
A comparative case study in a merged university hospital 
 
Introduction  
Following the amalgamation of top management and consolidation of administrative functions 
at the KUH in 2004, all newly appointed heads of the clinical departments with duplicating 
units at the two sites were given the same assignment: to integrate the units within the same 
medical specialty into single a entity under a common management structure and reduce costs. 
By 2006, this clinical integration had failed for Department X, but succeeded for Department Y. 
How can these different merger outcomes be explained? 
 
Background 
Since clinical departments are the units providing patient care and service delivery, a hospital 
merger will remain incomplete unless integration is achieved on that organizational level also. 
Yet most merger research focuses on the hospital as the unit of analysis, leaving merger conse-
quences for clinical departments by and large unstudied. Moreover, the literature emphasizes 
that it is important to examine how operational middle management deals with those complex 
change processes in order to identify, de facto, the factors that advance or obstruct post-merger 
integration at the level of service operations. However, very few merger studies look specifi-
cally at the role of middle management in post-merger processes. This research gap is even 
more evident in the study of mergers in health care. To contribute to the limited amount of em-
pirical research on merger consequences for clinical units, the objective of this study is to ex-
amine clinical management’s efforts to integrate clinical units following a hospital merger. 
 
Methodology  
For this study two embedded cases of clinical integration efforts that had produced remarkably 
different outcomes were compared. Each of the studied departments (Department X and De-
partment Y) consisted of two original departments of the same specialty at each site. The study 
is based on 22 interviews with members of the clinical staff (i.e. physicians, nurses, secretaries 
and clinical managers) and on document studies. For both Department X and Department Y, we 
balanced the number of interviewees from HUH and KH evenly (an exception was the external 
clinical manager recruited to Department X). The purpose of the interviews was to obtain the 
clinical managers’ and the clinical staffs’ views on how the change process evolved during the 
three years immediately following the hospital merger. Data were collected in the years 2004 to 
2007. This was complemented with some data from 2010 for the purpose of examining the 
status of integration six years post-merger. After both cases were reconstructed, they were 
compared in order to establish possible explanations for their different outcomes. The empirical 
patterns were then compared with previous studies and relevant organizational theory. 
 
Case description 
Following the successful integration of top management and initial consolidation of administra-
tive functions at HUH and KH, the work of combining the duplicate clinics in these two pre-
merger hospitals started in the spring of 2004. The plan was to reduce 125 clinical departments 
to 74. The executive management delegated identical assignments to all clinical management: 
to reduce costs by 10% and to integrate the original pre-merger departments at each site into 
single departments, each with a common management. It was this clinical management’s task to 
work out the details of the planned amalgamation. This study describes two cases – one suc-
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cessful, the other unsuccessful – of the formation of merged clinical departments. The aim is to 
explore what critical factors that may advance or obstruct clinical integration efforts following a 
hospital merger.  
 
In the “unsuccessful” case, a clinical manager, with a specialist’s license in the specialty of the 
department, was recruited externally by top management. He exercised delegated powers from 
top management and acted according to the adopted managerial agenda (i.e. initiated large, 
rapid, top-down changes). As the staff at one of the clinical units had suffered from poor leader-
ship previously, they felt that this approach was appropriate. The other clinical unit had had a 
strong and popular leader, and protested vividly against the clinical manager’s “dictatorial” 
style. The conflict escalated when external events such as the political decision to close both an 
emergency unit and an elective care ward affected these clinicians negatively. The clinical staff 
eventually forced the new clinic manager to leave, who became a scapegoat of the merger. Af-
ter a long and troublesome search, a new clinical manager from a private hospital was ap-
pointed new formal manager. In the meantime, senior physicians at each site took over the op-
erational leadership informally, and were later also appointed site managers in practice. Three 
years post-merger, an additional management level had been added to the departmental struc-
ture contrary to top management’s goal of reducing administration levels and costs. Perhaps 
most significantly, physicians and nurses from both sites perceived the distance as “the perime-
ter of the earth minus 30 km”. Six years post-merger, the situation was reported to be status 
quo.  
 
In the “successful” case, the two clinical managers at each site formed in effect shared leader-
ship “in tandem” from the very beginning. One of them was formally appointed clinical man-
ager and the other worked as his deputy. They showed responsiveness to opinions from senior 
physicians. The amalgamation process was discussed with staff, and constituted a bottom-up 
process. Since they suspected a latent “horizontal” tension between the professionals at the two 
sites, both clinical managers attended all meetings together, and made sure to listen to all views 
at every meeting and “anchor” their decisions. Eventually, the deputy manager was able to re-
turn to his position as a specialist physician. The tandem leadership was also supported by an 
informal leader, a professor who forcefully emphasized the benefits of the merger in terms of 
improved conditions for research. By placing the clinical everyday work in an international sci-
entific context, the professor encouraged all staff categories of the two sites to collaborate and 
integrate with each other across hospital borders as a way to achieve research success, which 
even contributed to spontaneous integration. In practice, the clinical manager and the professor 
defined that they had two constituencies to serve: top management “upwards” and clinical staff 
“downwards”. By dividing these managerial duties, the professor took the strategic role as the 
visionary of the merged department “downwards”, whereas the clinical manager dealt with the 
economic and operational issues on a daily basis, including reporting to hospital management 
“upwards”.  
 
Both the 10% cost savings and an integrated department with a common management were 
achieved in the time specified by the assignment. Staff and manager turnover was low, and 
group cohesion was reportedly strong. Three years post-merger clinical staff members reported 
that they belonged to the same clinical department and shared the same vision driven by re-
search excellence. Six years post-merger, the situation was still reported as satisfactory with the 
same management constellation of a formal clinical manager and an informal professor running 
the department. 
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Findings and discussion 
Whilst acknowledging that multiple factors may lead to success or failure post-merger, the 
comparison of the two cases  identified three managerial factors that seem to have contributed 
to the remarkably different outcomes. These factors were  the new clinical managers’ different 
1) interpretation of his formal mandate, 2) design of the middle management system, and, 3) 
approach to change. Factors that hindered integration were a sole attention on the formal man-
date from the top management, leadership based on one formal actor, and the use of a planned 
top-down approach to change. Factors that facilitated integration were a dual attention to two 
majors stakeholders (top management and clinical staff), shared leadership between multiple 
actors, including an informal leader, and the use of an emergent, bottom-up management ap-
proach to change within the planned assignment. These findings are further discussed in this 
section. 
 
The “unilateral” orientation towards a “pure” managerialism of the clinical manager in the 
“failed” case was somewhat surprising, since research shows that physicians who become man-
agers usually maintain a firm identification as medical professional even in an intense managed 
care environment. His attention to the requirements of the medical professionals occurred only 
when their trust in him was already severely damaged at one site, which eroded the necessary 
capacity-for-action needed to shift change strategy. In contrast, the clinical manager in the 
“successful” case chose to “serve two masters” from the beginning i.e. the management and the 
professionals. In other words, this clinical manager re-interpreted his mandate in a way that ac-
corded better with the actual context of competing institutional logics, which formed the basis 
for his actions including the design of a management constellation and approach to change. 
 
Although previous research clearly points out difficulties in avoiding negative effects when in-
tegrating clinics, the study shows that the predicted danger of horizontal tension between merg-
ing entities can be met through shared leadership, including tandem leadership between two 
“equals”. To handle the vertical tension between managerialism and professionalism, however, 
an informal leader (e.g. the professor) protected the professional arena and demonstrated re-
search success as an aligning force across the two sites. The formal leader took responsibility 
for the administrative arena and thereby shielded the professional arena from institutional pres-
sure from “above”. This division of responsibility resembles the decoupling strategy often 
found in politicized settings. It also demonstrates a separation of the challenging function for 
clinical managers to balance dual and often conflicting needs and demands of both the organi-
zation and the medical professionals. The successful use of a shared leadership suggests that an 
overemphasized reliance on a “strong individual leadership” (typically recommended by the 
traditional merger literature), cannot be assumed for management of complex change processes. 
The useful division of the clinical management function might actually call for a shared clinical 
leadership where each actor has the main responsibility for one “pure” arena (professional or 
administrative) rather than one “hybrid professional” being responsible for balancing two com-
peting logics. 
 
In line with merger prescriptions for professional organizations, an incremental and bottom-up 
approach was more successful than the planned, top-down approach. Merger research on pro-
fessional service firms confirms that managerial efforts imposed in a planned top-down manner 
may cause professionals with valuable knowledge and skills to leave an organization, thus erod-
ing potential merger synergies. However, a closer look at the “successful” case reveals that the 
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emergent bottom-up change took place within planned boundaries set by the executive man-
agement. This finding reflects the more recent research stream that combines planned and 
emergent change. Taken together, the findings in this study basically agree with literature’s pre-
scriptions for successful change management of mergers of professional organizations. 
 
Implications 
Although previous research clearly points to the difficulty of avoiding negative effects when 
clinics integrate, the “successful case” in this study shows that merger pitfalls to a certain extent 
can be avoided when inclusive management practices are employed. In order to achieve suc-
cessful clinical integration it seems important that middle managers are bold enough to make to 
re–interpret their formal mandate, to design a management system which involves informal 
leaders and introduce changes in a consultative process. Shared leadership seems to have ad-
vantages over individual leadership especially when striving for clinical integration. 
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6 DISCUSSION    
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
University hospitals are large and highly complex organizations. They are said to be perhaps 
“the most complex organizations in human history” (Peter Drucker, cited in Goldsmith, 1999: 
150). In addition, mergers involve a difficult change process in which multiple factors may lead 
to failure more frequently than success (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Kavanagh & Ash-
kanasy, 2006). Therefore, a university hospital merger is inevitably a highly complex event. In 
this thesis the general aim is to increase our understanding of challenging change processes at 
large and complex organizations, specifically those processes in a merger of two university 
hospitals.  
 
The three studies of this thesis dealt with the Karolinska University Hospital merger. Both pre- 
and post-merger processes and different organizational levels/units were analysed. Among oth-
er things, this approach helped us to understand: how a merger that was considered “impossi-
ble” became possible (Study I); how and why top management’s intended ambitions resulted in 
an unintended convergent process and dysfunctional outcomes (Study II); and why considera-
bly different merger results were produced by the two embedded cases of clinical integration 
efforts (Study III). Together, the three studies explain how this process and outcome evolved 
through a non-linear, unpredictable and complex interplay between external and internal factors 
and actors. 
 
While an in-depth analysis and a detailed discussion of the critical factors affecting and explain-
ing the merger process and outcome are presented elsewhere in the thesis (for details, see the 
separate studies), the aim in this section is to present a holistic view of the merger process by 
“putting the pieces together” based on the following procedure. (1) First, a quick overview of 
the case is given. (2) Second, the merger motives are discussed in relation to previous research. 
(3) Third, the merger outcomes are discussed in relation to relevant literature. (4) The next sec-
tion examines plausible explanations to the merger process and outcome. This is done by dis-
cussing five central dimensions of the merger process by incorporating illustrative examples 
from the three studies and from the merger literature. The overall purpose is to shed light on the 
critical and complex link between the process and the outcome of that process. In other words, 
this section links to the core of the theoretical school within which this thesis is positioned: the 
process school. (5) The next section points out the thesis’ main findings and contributions to 
merger research. (6) which is followed by a discussion considering methodological strengths 
and weaknesses. (7) Finally, in order to further deepen our understanding of complex change 
processes in professional, public sector settings, an attempt to formulate a theoretical contribu-
tion is done, which is rounded up with suggestions for future research.  
 
 
6.2 CASE OVERVIEW 
On 1 January 2004, the Karolinska Hospital (KH) and the Huddinge University Hospital 
(HUH), both located in Stockholm, Sweden, 30 km apart, merged to form the Karolinska Uni-
versity Hospital (KUH). The merger decision was controversial, complex and far from obvious. 
On 9 December 2003, the formal merger decision passed by a single vote in the Stockholm 
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County Council (SCC). The day after the formal merger decision, the SCC installed a non-
executive hospital Board that appointed a new hospital Director. The new Director was offi-
cially in charge of KUH. To achieve a balanced budget by the next political election in 2006, 
the new Director was told to reduce expenditures by €70 million over the next three years 
(€10M in 2004; €50M in 2005; €10M in 2006). In the spring of 2004, all clinical managers 
were given identical formal assignments by the new top management: to reduce costs by 10% 
and to consolidate 125 departments with the same medical specialty into 74 departments with a 
new common management. In 2006, clinical integration had failed for Department X, but had 
succeeded for Department Y, both within Division Z. For the hospital as a whole, there was a 
surplus of €10 million in 2004. However, the second and third years post-merger (2005–2006) 
ended in deficits. In total, over the three-year period, the predicted cost savings for the merger 
were not achieved. Eventually the original implementation plan was withdrawn, the hospital 
Director left the organization and a replacement was appointed. This second Director reduced 
the management group and initiated incremental change projects within pockets of an already 
existing structure. Thus, the first chapter of the Karolinska University Hospital merger had 
ended.  
 
 
6.3 MERGER MOTIVES 
Both stated and unstated motives were given for the decision to merge KH and HUH. These 
motives agree with previous findings on hospital merger motives in the public sector (see e.g. 
Denis et al., 1992; Fulop et al., 2002, 2005). More specifically, the stated motives were antici-
pated improvements in economic efficiency and research excellence, whereas the unstated mo-
tive was political gains.xii Although the research excellence motive changed to a stronger focus 
on economic efficiency in the last pre-merger phase, it was clearly a stated motive at the time of 
the formal merger decision. The finding of research excellence as a stated motive coincides 
with previous Swedish (although limited) research on university hospital mergers (Brorström, 
2004; Hallin, 2000). 
 
It is unsurprising that research excellence and prestige is an important driver of university hos-
pital mergers. Yet much of the existing research de facto reports that university hospital merg-
ers (Kastor, 2003, 2010a, b; Mallon, 2003; Pellegrini, 2001) are driven by bottom-line econom-
ics and not by research concerns. Kitchener (2002) however noted that “cutting-edge research” 
was an unstated motive in the UCSF/Stanford hospital merger, whereas the stated motive was 
based on efficiency arguments because it “makes straightforward economic and operation 
sense. It reduces administrative overhead” (Kitchener, 2002: 407). This reduction to a strict fo-
cus on bottom-line economics is similar to the evolution of the pre-merger process in the KUH-
case (Study I). Overall, studies from the US generally report that hospital mergers in general are 
undertaken with the aim of achieving improved or more stable financial conditions (see Bazzoli 
et al., 2004; Goddard & Ferguson, 1997). This aim is consistent with the dominant efficiency 
theory used to support mergers in the traditional industry (Trautwein, 1990). Because findings 
of research excellence reported by Swedish research (this thesis included), differ from US ex-
perience, stated motives for university hospital mergers may vary by context. Given the fact 
that US health care is to a far larger extent in private hands (including university hospitals) than 
Europe, one reason could therefore be that AHCs in the US are less insulated from market 
forces than university hospitals in Sweden (see also Kitchener, 2002, for similar reasoning).  
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As mentioned above, it is also evident from Study I, that mergers in the public sector may be 
driven by unstated motives (e.g. political gains). Drawing on parallels with previous research, 
the conclusion is that merger motives in the public sector may not necessarily result from stated 
(Fulop et al., 2002, 2005) and/or economic efficiency motives only (Denis et al., 1992). Conse-
quently, in agreement with Trautwein (1990), current merger prescriptions – which are still 
dominated by efficiency arguments – are a dangerous guide for people participating in merger 
processes. In short, the findings in this thesis suggest that merger motives may be of different 
kinds (e.g. stated and unstated), may be several in parallel (e.g. economic efficiency and re-
search excellence) and may vary by context (e.g. political drivers in the public sector). In par-
ticular, differences in institutional context seem to be instrumental in explaining identified dif-
ferences in underlying drivers. Because current prescriptions are dominated by data from pri-
vate sector settings, the suggestion here is that the general understanding of merger motives 
should be more nuanced (particularly for those taking place in public sector settings) and should 
take greater recognition of the institutional context.   
 
 
6.4 MERGER OUTCOMES 
The review of previous research (see chapter 2) shows that the outcomes of horizontal mergers 
are mixed, patchy and even contradictory. However, the bulk of the evidence seems to support 
the position that mergers are high-risk strategies (see 2.1.7). This seems to be particularly true 
in the health care area where research shows that most mergers fail (Andreopoulus, 1997; 
Blackstone & Fuhr, 2003; Mallon, 2003, McClenahan, 1999). For example, a study of 300 of 
the 750 hospital mergers that occurred between 1994 and 1998 in the US showed that most 
failed (Todd, 1999). 
 
In the KUH merger, the regional government (the SCC) issued a specific assignment to top 
management: to save €70 million (equivalent to 7% of the annual turnover) in the next three 
years. If the success of the KUH merger is evaluated purely in terms of whether these cost sav-
ings were achieved, it is a straightforward task to assess the merger outcome. Although the hos-
pital Director and the Board thought the savings figure was “peanuts” compared to cost reduc-
tions typical of manufacturing industry, the KUH did not achieve these financial goals in the 
specified three-year period. Hence, the KUH merger outcome agrees with the existing research 
that shows that mergers typically fail in one or several dimensions.  
 
Looking at the KUH merger in terms of its failure to achieve the three-year financial goals, var-
ious researchers might find support for their recurrent warnings about the “folly of merger ma-
nia” in health care (e.g. Andreopoulos, 1997; Goddard & Ferguson, 1997; Mallon, 2003; 
McClenahan, 1999; Todd, 1999). However, those studies assess merger outcome within the 
timeframe of 1 to 3 years post-merger. Consequently, this research, at best, measures the short-
term effects of hospital mergers rather than the long-term effects. In the research of this thesis, 
certain non-financial aspects (integration status) of the merger were evaluated even six years 
post-merger. 
 
The KUH merger presents a more nuanced picture of merger outcomes. Cost savings of €10 
million were achieved in the first year (resulting in a surplus of €10 million), but the mandated 
€50 and €10 million cost savings were not achieved in the second and third years There was a 
“jump start” in the first year when the post-merger hospital administration reduced costs. How-
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ever, this initial success was not matched in the next two years as various changes were imple-
mented in the organization. This pattern is consistent with several studies that have found that 
successful consolidation of administrative functions occurs quickly among horizontally merged 
hospitals, but that clinical changes typically are not fully implemented even years after a hospi-
tal merger has been formalized (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Eberhardt, 2001; Lesser & Brewster, 2001; 
Wicks et al., 1998). For example, Fulop et al. (2002) report that the clearest source of potential 
savings from a merger is the reduction in the numbers of management board members. The fi-
nance managers they interviewed “were less convinced that other savings were achieved within 
the first financial year” (Fulop et al., 2002:4). The authors also point out that senior manage-
ment seemingly had underestimated the amount of time and effort required by the mergers, re-
sulting in the delay in service developments by at least 18 months (Fulop et al., 2002). In the 
KUH merger, the initial successful cost savings followed by failure confirms the results of these 
studies. In fact, KUH produced the single largest financial deficit of the regional health care 
consumption in the second year after the merger (KUH Annual Report, 2006).  
 
Previous research reveals that the initial post-merger savings are quite limited. They tend to be 
small in magnitude (e.g. Connor et al., 1998; Lesser & Brewster, 2001), may simply represent 
movements away from prior inefficiency (Alexander et al., 1996), are quickly exhausted (Dran-
ove, 1998), largely result from administrative savings (Eberhardt, 2001), and may simply be 
one-shot savings rather than reductions in rates of cost growth (Bazzoli et al., 2004). Fulop et 
al. (2002) also report that the cost savings for four mergers of NHS trusts were minimal (al-
though they were not consistent for the four NHS trusts studied) and less than the estimated 
annual savings (£500 000). In the KUH merger, cost savings in the first year were equal to 
2%xiii of annual turnover, which by industry standards is considered small for mergers. Again, 
given that most studies (including this study of the KUH merger) only examine financial results 
1 to 3 years post-merger, this timeframe may be too early in the merger process to observe ap-
preciable savings. This may be especially true if knowledge synergies are taken into account. 
For knowledge-intensive organizations such as pharmaceutical companies, it may take 7 to 10 
years before merger synergies are realized (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). 
 
In the KUH merger, both research excellence and economic efficiency were the stated merger 
motives. Thus any evaluation of the KUH merger ought to consider whether these goals were 
achieved. Given that the realization of research synergies may take as long as ten years, the 
evaluation as far as research excellence indicates a longitudinal study is appropriate. The longer 
the timeframe, however, the more difficult it is to attribute the achievement/non-achievement of 
research excellence to the merger, especially given the turbulent context of the health care envi-
ronment (Fulop et al., 2002: 7). Furthermore, a problem is that researchers in general have diffi-
culty in deciding on appropriate measures of research and clinical excellence (see e.g. Sowden 
et al., 1997).  
 
Thus Department Y’s successful integration of two clinical units that was achieved in the first 
years post-merger (including reported research synergies, cost savings and even spontaneous 
horizontal integration) is somewhat of an anomaly (see Study III). Consequently, the unsuccess-
ful outcome of the failed clinical integration in Department X was according to previous merger 
research expected. Although the research of this thesis clearly identifies the difficulty of avoid-
ing negative effects when integrating clinical departments (Bazzoli et al., 2004, Fulop et al., 
2002, 2005; Kitchener, 2002), the successful integration in Department Y shows that merger 
pitfalls may be avoided and that task synergies and clinical integration may be produced even at 
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an early post-merger stage. At the hospital level, however, the research of this study supports 
previous key findings that report hospitals are able to quickly consolidate and integrate adminis-
trative functions-- albeit limited one-shot savings -- but clinical consolidation/integration is 
much harder to achieve (see review by Bazzoli et al., 2004).  
 
 
6.5 PROCESS SCHOOL REVISITED  
 
6.5.1 Pre-merger influence on post-merger work 
Managerialism, which was the rationale for and action logic driving top management’s post-
merger work (Study II), can be traced to the final decision-making phase in the pre-merger pro-
cess (Study I). Several key actors with various motives guided the pre-merger process in the 
beginning; in the end, the decision logic became a strict economic justification the SCC used to 
quickly legitimize the merger decision. Consequently, the SCC leaders specified short-term 
savings goals in the assignment they issued to the new hospital Director. In searching for a hos-
pital Director, they looked for an individual who had a private industry background with ex-
perience with budgets and cost reductions. The appointed Director had been the HUH Director 
and also had held top management positions in the pharmaceutical industry. Having received 
the cost-cutting assignment for the next three years (2004-2006), the new Director immediately 
took actions to achieve those stated economic goals of the merger. 
 
The more normative merger literature recommends that management delay working towards 
intended merger synergies (such as cost savings) until the staff members of the merged organi-
zations have accepted each other fully (Graebner, 2004). This recommendation in particular 
seems to be critical for knowledge-intensive organizations (Birkinshaw et al., 2000). However, 
the results of Study II show that the first phase of the post-merger integration process was driv-
en by an action logic based on “pure” business managerialism aimed at achieving early task 
synergies. Moreover, Study III shows that top management’s economic savings goal (originat-
ing from SCC in the pre-merger process) influenced the formal mandate assigned to the clinical 
manager. The same cost reduction goal of 10% was given to all clinical managers. This goal 
was based on rough estimates rather than on a detailed analysis of potential synergies. This 
short timeframe of three years in the KUH merger did not agree with the normative literature on 
hospital mergers that claims an extended time period is needed to build trust, to obtain buy-in 
and to deal with the resistance from the professionals (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Fulop et al, 2002; 
2005). Addressing operational tasks, especially at the clinical department level, should follow 
this lengthy time period of adjustment. 
 
Although several merger researchers have recognized the pre-merger process itself as a poten-
tially important determinant of the development and outcome of the post-merger integration 
process (Denis et al., 1992; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Trautwein, 
1990), there are very few studies that de facto describe the link between the pre- and post-
merger processes. Data from the three studies of this thesis show that the executive manage-
ment's formal mandate given by the political leaders in the pre-merger process strongly influ-
enced the early integration work at all levels of the organization (i.e. by the effect of manageri-
alism on top management work). The formal mandate effectively placed a number of restric-
tions on the work that was then passed on to the clinical department managers. By framing the 
merger mission to the clinical managers according to a strict business-managerial logic, the 
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manager in Department X (Study III) adopted a top-down approach to clinical integration, 
which contrasts to literature’s recommendation for professional organizations. By synthesizing 
the three studies, the managerial logic adopted in by the clinical manager in Department X 
(Study III) could be traced back to the formal mandate given by the top management (Study II), 
which in turn originated from the regional government (Study I). Hence, the critical link be-
tween the pre-merger and post-merger processes is clearly recognized in this thesis.  
 
 
6.5.2 Managerial hubris and managerial work 
Although there may be multiple reasons that may explain why management failed to anticipate 
and deal with the conflicts with the clinical staff, one main reason that crystallized in Study II 
was managerial hubris i.e. a tendency to be overenthusiastic and overconfident, as predicted by 
Seth et al. (2002). This managerial hubris arose after the initial year when the cost savings were 
achieved. Several factors seem to have contributed to the high spirit.  
 
First, the cost savings goal for the first post-merger year (2004) was achieved and even ex-
ceeded through administrative consolidations. However, research on hospital mergers shows 
that initial rationalization and integration of administration and other support activities are fairly 
straightforward because roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority are clear and duplicative 
functions are easily identified (Bazzoli et al., 2004). Research also posits that the lack of con-
flict and the presence of administrative hierarchies make initial consolidation achievable (Ibid). 
Again, these initial savings tend to be small in magnitude (Connor et al., 1998; Lesser & Brew-
ster, 2001) and may simply be one-shot savings (Bazzoli et al., 2004). The results of this thesis 
clearly confirm previous findings of “small initial wins” The achieved cost savings for the first 
year were – as previously mentioned - relatively small by average industry standards.  
 
Second, owing to the pressure of the strict deadlines imposed by the regional government, the 
management group worked intensively in closed-door meetings during the first post-merger 
year. A highly focused and intense work mode probably contributed to strong internal group 
coherence and the perception of tight control. In combination with support from other actors 
(such as the Board, the medical university and the political leadership) the management group 
may have experienced a false-sense-of-security (Vaara, 2001). 
 
Third, early in the merger process the hospital Director was successful in horizontally integrat-
ing the management groups from the two merging hospitals (cf. Santala, 1996). The Director 
demanded unity and gave equal attention to both sites. These actions are consistent with the 
normative literature that advocates the necessity of addressing horizontal cultural differences at 
an early stage (Datta, 1991; Sales & Mirvis, 1984). Studies of university hospital mergers have 
also found that a main reason for failure may be attributed to horizontal tensions and clashes 
between top management and trustees at early stages (Cohen & Jennings, 2005; Kastor, 2003, 
2010b). However, although the research claims that horizontal integration of top management is 
necessary for overcoming resistance between the merging organizations at later stages (Santala, 
1996, Schriber, 2006), such integration may be insufficient, as explained next.   
 
The hospital Director selected management group members and explicitly required loyalty to 
the Director and the organization i.e. physician-members were committed to a full-time mana-
gerial role. In making these selections, the Director wished to be accepted by those members 
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who had a medical background also. Her creation of a strong managerial culture and her em-
phasis on a commitment to the economic goals appear to have contributed to the quick and suc-
cessful horizontal integration of the top management group (Santala, 1996). In other words, the 
suppression of professionalism as a working logic was necessary if the initial horizontal integra-
tion was to be achieved. Ironically, a suppression of professionalism (i.e. the requirement for 
successful horizontal integration) seriously impaired management’s ability to anticipate and 
handle the vertical conflict between managerialism and professionalism that came to dominate 
the subsequent merger process. Paradoxically, a main finding is that a successful integration of 
the management group may damage rather than support integration further down the organiza-
tion, which is contrary to contemporary literature prescription (see e.g. Santala). This resonates 
well with previous merger findings in health care (see 2.2.6), where most research shows that a 
successful initial consolidation of administration may not provide the basis for dealing with 
tougher issues at a later point, as posited by Shortell et al. (1994). To avoid the dangerous trap 
of managerial hubris that misguides top management (Seth et al., 2002), a true understanding of 
the multiple competing institutional logics inherent in hospital mergers is recognized as a more 
appropriate basis for executive work rather than “pure” managerialism.  
 
 
6.5.3 Internal conflict between managers and professionals 
Both Study II and Study III consistently reveal that the main post-merger challenge was the 
conflict between managerialism and professionalism at all levels of the organization (Kitchener 
& Gask, 2003). When management’s planned post-merger work reached the clinical depart-
ments, problems arose. The post-merger work was quickly overshadowed by the clinicians’ 
escalating frustration with the Director and the use of business logic to justify the merger. The 
failure of clinical integration (Department X in Study III) is partly explained by the fact that the 
department head adopted a managerial logic in his approach to clinical integration.  
 
The professionals’ firm resistance at both the hospital and clinical levels as observed in this 
study matches previous research on hospital mergers (Bazzoli et al., 2004; Fulop et al., 2002, 
2005). This resistance is also consistent with general merger research on professional service 
firms in the private sector that shows that professionals typically control the pace of integration 
at all levels (e.g. Empson, 2000, 2001; Løwendahl, 2005). According to Greenwood et al. 
(1994), special challenges arise with integration in professional organizations largely because 
the leadership has limited control over the activities requiring mission-critical knowledge. The 
initiative for integration is said to depend on the level of the independent-minded professionals’ 
trust in management and their will to integrate (Empson, 2000). For this reason, the research 
suggests that management refrain from deliberately planned actions in order not to destroy trust 
in management by such professionals (Graebner, 2004). However, despite the clinical staff’s 
escalating mistrust of the management and their growing resistance to managerial actions, man-
agement at different levels at the KUH continued to implement top-down changes as planned 
(cf. Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006). The effort to justify the merger with arguments based on 
professionalism occurred too late, when the trust in management was already severely damaged 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  
 
This research reveals that the degree of conflict between managerialism and professionalism 
may vary over time, manifesting the “vertical” conflict in various ways. Because of the inner, 
strong cohesion within the top management group, the division heads i.e. the physician-
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managers (see Montgomery, 2001 for more details on “hybrid professions”) initially defended 
the hospital Director who had become the symbol of managerialism and a merger scapegoat. 
Hence, the competing logics were initially demonstrated as a vertical clash between the man-
agement group and the clinical staff. Further down the organization, problems with core clinical 
operations arose because of increased service disruptions (see also Fulop et al., 2002). Escalat-
ing conflicts forced the division heads to spend considerable (unscheduled) time dealing with 
the discontent in “unpleasant and tempestuous” staff meetings. The division heads soon showed 
divided loyalties. On the one hand, they were committed to the formal mission (managerial-
ism); on the other hand, they were committed to their clinical staff (professionalism). Following 
the increasing pressure from medical colleagues, a split within the top management group oc-
curred. Division heads with administrative background remained loyal to the logic of manageri-
alism, and those who were physicians “retreated” to an earlier position primarily acknowledg-
ing the logic of professionalism.  Several conclusions can be drawn from the conflict between 
these competing logics.   
 
First, it is evident from our research that it is extremely difficult for an individual in a hybrid 
position to balance the dual logics of managerialism and professionalism that are inherent in 
many administrative positions in health care (Montgomery, 2001). Second, the professionals 
saw the division heads in the top management group as informal channels that could be used to 
influence the management agenda in favour of professionalism, apparently successfully. Third-
ly, the intensity of the vertical conflict between managerialism and professionalism seems to 
vary over time and arenas, where the conflict seemingly increases over time as the merger proc-
esses comes closer to and interferes with core clinical operations (Bazzoli et al., 2004).  
 
In conclusion, severe and escalating conflicts with the clinical staff forced management to 
abandon its original plan and instead (reluctantly) to address unanticipated and unscheduled 
actions, recognizing the loss of control in the now undirected, post-merger integration process. 
Based on these observations, it appears that the vertical clash between managerialism and pro-
fessionalism is the main post-merger challenge in a hospital merger, not fully acknowledged in 
the existing merger literature. 
 
 
6.5.4 External actors entering the conflict 
External actors also influenced the post-merger integration process that was already the scene 
of conflict between the managers and the professionals. When the clinical staff went to the 
press with their various complaints, the media became involved in the conflict. The use of the 
media to influence a managerial agenda, points to the importance of being aware of “intra- and 
inter-organizational dynamics” inherent in public sector organizations (McNulty & Ferlie, 
2002; 2004). The clinical staff’s frequent allegations and inquiries channelled through the me-
dia forced the hospital Director to attend to problems that she might otherwise have devoted 
less attention to. She was frustrated because dealing with these problems took time away from 
internal affairs. She also became increasingly defensive since the media seemed to focus on her 
alleged managerial inadequacies.    
 
The conflict between managerialism and professionalism intensified when another external ac-
tor entered the stage: the political opposition. Hoping to score election points, the political op-
position allied with the professionals to jointly voice complaints in the media against the hospi-
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tal Director. The charge was that she had focused too much on finances and not enough on 
quality of care and patient safety. Gradually, the professionals took over the management 
agenda by effectively using these external actors to their own advantage.  
 
By the third year post-merger, external pressure forced management to change the agenda by 
prioritizing patient safety (i.e. professionalism) and to downplay the planned cost savings (i.e. 
managerialism) at least outwardly. Top management withdrew from the clinical arena, waiting 
for the storm to blow over. No new activities related to the original merger ambitions were in-
troduced. Top management had to back away from its original strategy as a result of the exter-
nal pressure from the media and the political opposition. In contrast to traditional merger litera-
ture, that reports that external factors do not notably affect management work in merger proc-
esses (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Graebner, 2004; Larsson, 1990), Study II clearly reveals that 
external actors can shape both the post-merger process and the outcome through interaction 
with internal actors (i.e. the professionals). This complex interplay may even explain the transi-
tions between the post-merger phases observed in the KUH merger.   
 
Moreover, merger studies in private industry show that executive management pro-actively us-
es the media as an arena to interpret, explain and argue for the legitimacy of a merger to the 
public (Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003). In this study the Director was unable to use 
the media to convey management’s counter-defensive message. Instead, clinical staff members 
used the media pro-actively in efforts to reorient the hospital agenda from managerialism to 
professionalism, which clearly shows that the use of media in merger processes may vary by 
institutional context.  
 
Leadership in public organizations is by definition a public concern in which the public, the 
media, and politicians are expected to debate, investigate, and criticize decisions and actions 
(Holmberg, 1986). This means that actions and decisions viewed as expressions of competence 
and loyalty in a private sector context might be viewed as expressions of incompetence and dis-
loyalty in a public sector context, and vice versa (Ibid). Organizations in the public sector (such 
as university hospitals) are politically controlled and follow principles of transparency (e.g. free 
access to public records). In the public sector, political and external considerations are at least 
as important as the internal economic realities that typically frame the context of company mer-
gers. Thus, top management in public sector organizations must realize that dealing with the 
media and the public should be considered as natural parts of their work and agenda. 
 
However, when the medical professionals in this study contacted the media to further their 
agenda, the hospital Director and board members – all with private sector backgrounds – were 
dismayed by what they perceived as disloyalty. The division heads with a medical background, 
on the other hand, were not surprised, since they thought media attention was justified by the 
transparency logic of public sector organizations. The private sector vs. public sector issue is 
yet another competing logic that reveals the complexity of the process, while it also deepens our 
understanding for why the process turned out undirected and why unintended outcomes were 
produced, which again imply that merger processes seem to be highly sensitive to context. 
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6.5.5 Critical events triggering changes in logic  
In Study I, the critical event of an unexpected verdict (the disapproval of the unbalanced county 
budget) triggered a political crisis in the regional government. The verdict set the stage for the 
controversial decision to merge the two university hospitals. Taking a neo-institutional perspec-
tive, we suggest that a change of decision logic -- from decision rationality to action rationality 
-- was crucial for the uncritical adoption of the merger idea to happen. Where once the merger 
had been considered impossible, it now became possible. Since decision rationality is usually 
found in public sector organizations, and action rationality in private sector firms, this change in 
decision logic may, therefore, be viewed as a change of institutional logic: from the public sec-
tor to the private sector. The political leaders confirmed this change. One politician described 
the final pre-merger phase as “like a merger in the business world”.  
 
In Study II, the political decision to reduce the capacity of the emergency department at one of 
the sites confronted top management in the second year post-merger. This decision had impor-
tant ramifications as to the post-merger process. The division heads were already under stress 
because of the escalating resistance by clinical staff and because of the turbulent situation in 
general. While the division heads felt loyalty to the hospital Director and to the cost-cutting 
goals (i.e. managerialism), they also experienced an inner conflict stemming from their dual 
role as both manager and physician. This conflict increased when their medical colleagues 
complained openly about top management and the merger. Although several factors contributed 
to their change of logic, it seems that this political decision caused the division heads to finally 
switch their loyalty from the hospital Director and the management agenda (i.e. managerialism) 
to the clinical staff and their medical agenda (i.e. professionalism). This split within the man-
agement team triggered the last phase of the executive work, which was increasingly influenced 
by pressures from internal actors (division heads and clinical staff) and external actors (media, 
political opposition) advocating professionalism over managerialism. Three years post-merger, 
professionalism steered the executive work and had thus taken over the hospital agenda  
 
In Study III, Department X was also affected when the same political decision as above hit the 
new clinical manager unexpectedly. This closure decision meant that high volume and emer-
gency care would be reduced at Clinical Unit Xk. The political leadership (SCC) justified the 
decision with the argument that only rare and complicated patient cases should be treated at Xk. 
However, an earlier political decision to close a ward at Xk had already generated severe pro-
tests against the new manager by the clinical staff at Xk. A second critical event unexpectedly 
occurred about the same time – the Thailand tsunami disaster of 2004. The staff at the Xk unit 
“made a huge effort” to help the survivors, partly to demonstrate the necessity for maintaining 
the ward. Although department manager X tried to act on behalf of the clinical staff by imped-
ing top management’s closure decision, he was unsuccessful. When the ward closed, key staff 
members left, and the Xk unit “collapsed” into “complete chaos” due to inadequate staffing.  
The effort to change loyalty to the professionals came too late. Eventually, the clinical staff at 
Xk forced the new department manager to resign. Following his involuntary resignation, angry 
staff at the opposite hospital site (i.e. unit Xh) for the first time expressed their antagonism to-
wards their colleagues at Xk. The Xk members however, continued to regard the Xh members 
as their medical peers and colleagues in their continuous battle against the management and the 
merger.  
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Although, the merger literature points to the horizontal tension between merging organizations 
as an early and perhaps main merger challenge, this example shows that the horizontal tension 
was triggered at a later stage by the resignation of department manager X. His resignation is 
traceable to the political decisions made by the regional government. Hence, these examples 
from Study I and Study II demonstrate that unexpected political decisions were the triggers for 
an uncontrollable chain of events, which, among many things, fuelled the mobilization of pro-
fessionals. Ultimately this battle led to professionalism regaining its dominance over manageri-
alism, which was manifested by top management’s announcement of “patient safety” for the 
third year post-merger and by the discharge of the hospital Director that followed. 
 
By “putting the pieces together” (i.e. the three studies), the picture below illustrates the pre- and 
post-merger processes in the case of the Karolinska University Hospital merger. In particular, 
the picture highlights the link between the preceding and the subsequent phase/process and also 
the multiple competing logics inherent in professionalized, public settings:   
 
 
Figure 1: Pre- and post-merger processes in         
the Karolinska University Hospital merger
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6.6 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
While the organizational research tradition uses a wide variety of approaches, often with large 
overlap, a qualitative in-depth case study design was selected as the most appropriate approach 
for the primary goal of developing theoretical and empirical understandings of an unfolding 
merger process within its actual context (Yin, 1999; 2003). Overall, this method permits the 
verification and description of the critical link between the change process and the outcome of 
that process, which is the central aim of the process school in which this thesis is positioned. 
  
The data collection process for a case study is more complex than those used in other research 
strategies (Yin, 2003). To ensure quality during the data collection process, Yin’s (2003) rec-
ommended principles for maximizing the benefits of case study design were therefore followed. 
These principles are described next. 
 
Use multiple sources of evidence (triangulation): A major strength in case study data collection 
is the use of many different sources of evidence although the collection process imposes a great 
burden on the researcher. This means that any finding in a case study is likely to be much more 
convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources and methods of information. 
Data collection for this thesis was pluralistic in several ways. For example, it incorporated mul-
tiple stakeholder groups in both the pre- and post-merger process who were deemed relevant for 
the study of university hospitals (e.g. the affiliated medical school, the owner of the hospitals, 
the top management, etc.). However, Yin (2003) asserts that the most important advantage of 
using multiple empirical sources is that this method allows the researcher to develop converg-
ing lines of inquiry through the process of triangulation. Guided by this recommendation, three 
different methods of data collection were used: interviews, documents and observations. 
 
Create a case study database: The main objective of a database is to allow the data collected to 
be readily retrievable for later inspection. All data collected for this thesis were stored in such a 
manner that other persons could retrieve the data efficiently at a later date. For example, the 
interviews were recorded on digital audiotapes and then transcribed and stored as Word files. In 
particular, qualitative research software was used (NVivo 7.0) to organize and categorize the 
data for later access. The interviews were archived by registering them by a number, time, place 
and category. Notes, which were taken at observations, were stored securely with interview 
files/tapes and documents, either in a locked storage or in digital format with password protec-
tion.  
 
Maintain a chain of evidence: To increase the trustworthiness of the data collected, another 
recommended principle is to maintain a chain of evidence, since this chain allows the re-
searcher to trace the process backward. For this thesis, all interviews/citations in the case study 
database were linked to key events, dominant themes, subcategories, categories and clusters. 
The software, NVivo 7.0, permitted tracing categories and subcategories to the evidentiary 
source (e.g. the interviewees). Reversely, all data in each category and subcategory were di-
rectly linked to the key source information, which in turn was cross-referenced to a database in 
Excel with information on the interview (e.g. day, time, place). In this way, the desired chain of 
evidence was maintained. 
 
   51 
The inclusion of illustrative quotations from the interviewees in the case descriptions in the 
three articles allows the reader to link the empirical data to the study findings. A rich case de-
scription with quotations should also allow the reader to make his or her own interpretation of 
the data, at least to some extent. In this way, readers and scholars are encouraged to challenge 
the empirical patterns and theoretical interpretations suggested by the thesis author, given that a 
“purely” positivistic view (claims of one “universal truth”) is refuted by the research tradition in 
which this study rests.  
 
Throughout the study, the levels of trustworthiness were enhanced in several other ways. Apart 
from cross-checking data consistency (see e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1994), triangulation was 
used to search for rival explanations (see Patton, 2002; Yin, 1999). The search for non-
corroborative evidence from alternative sources was conducted to reduce the influence of inter-
viewer bias (see also “negative evidence testing” in Patton, 2002; Yin, 1999, 2003). In a further 
step to ensure trustworthiness, the interviewees were sampled from multiple stakeholder groups 
(e.g. administration, political majority, political opposition, the medical university, the hospital 
board) and professional groupings (e.g. managers, secretaries, physicians, nurses) at different 
managerial levels (e.g. regional government, top management, clinical management) and arenas 
(e.g. political, research, hospital, clinical). The aim of this sampling was to secure a broad spec-
trum of responses from relevant people whose perspectives might be complementary, conflict-
ing or even contradictory (Hurley, 1999). In addition, validation was used in which drafts of the 
thesis articles were sent to available key informants, asking for their confirmation of prelimi-
nary findings and for additional data (see also “member checking” in Devers, 1999). Member 
checking was also used when group presentations were given to several respondents at the same 
time (e.g. the top management group) on different occasions.  
 
It may be argued that the data for this thesis provide high internal validity but low levels of ex-
ternal validity. This issue was addressed by comparing and testing the research results against a 
wider body of relevant literature at all stages of the research process. In addition, several re-
searchers were involved in the data analysis process to ensure the validity of the inference proc-
ess. In the course of reaching agreement, this meant that scholars representing multiple disci-
plines extensively discussed and challenged the interpretations of the discovered patterns using 
existing theories from the general merger and change management literature, health care re-
structuring literature and institutional and neo-institutional theories.  
 
Although the embedded case study design is the more extensive variant of a single case design, 
it was chosen because it provides operational details not allowed by a solely holistic design on 
the hospital level. Indeed, this approach also generated key insights at the clinical department 
level, which among many things revealed critical factors that may explain the production of 
functional outcomes unpredicted by the literature. Moreover, leading scholars argue that studies 
that try to link process to outcomes is stronger because such studies reduce the complexity of 
the study design and avoid the danger of drowning in qualitative data that are difficult to shape 
in any thematic fashion (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002; Miles, 1979). Guided by this recommenda-
tion, the embedded clinical cases of this thesis were selected based on maximum variance in 
outcomes within the same context (i.e. Division Z within the KUH). This approach aided in 
linking the critical factors and distinguishable phases in the pre-merger process through the 
post-merger process to the production of successful and unsuccessful outcomes, which demon-
strates the value of the case sampling method used in this study.  
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The findings of this research result from a single case study (i.e. a merged university hospital in 
Sweden). Therefore the question of generalization deserves attention. This study is concerned 
primarily with the case of merger processes in public health care. Care must therefore be taken 
when transferring the findings and tentative explanations from the context of professionalized, 
public service settings to other contexts, such as private industrial settings.  
 
In recognition that merger processes have no clear beginning and no clear end, it is clear that 
the findings of this thesis may be limited to the initial post-merger period of a radical change 
initiative. The post-merger period reported in this thesis covers to a large extent only the first 
three years. Because merger studies in health care generally have assessed outcome effects 
within one to three years after hospital consolidation, researchers argue that these studies are at 
best measuring the short-term effects of hospital consolidation. However, integration status was 
reported to be status quo when validating data six years post-merger (in the year 2010). Hence, 
this study indicates that the functional and dysfunctional outcomes may actually reflect long-
term effects of a university hospital merger.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
7.1 COMPETING LOGICS IN HOSPITAL MERGERS 
This thesis clearly shows that a hospital merger is a process involving a complex interplay of 
internal and external factors as well as actors in which the hospital management finds it difficult 
to predict and pro-actively handle relevant issues and conflicts (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; 
Greenwood et al., 1994). In particular, hospital management may not appreciate sufficiently the 
intra- and inter-organizational dynamics inherent in the process such as the professionals’ effec-
tive use of the media and the political opposition’s efforts to further their own agendas in gov-
ernment (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). Hence this study supports the process school’s criticism of 
the normative strategy school whose proponents assume that management, in advance, can dis-
cover and handle relevant strategic and organizational differences (e.g. Greenwood et al., 1994; 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). In agreement with the process school per-
spective, this study clearly shows that there are several in-built impediments in the merger pro-
cess itself that obscure its complexity (e.g. the risk of managerial hubris), which makes it diffi-
cult for management to plan and carry out smooth post-merger integration.   
 
Additionally, this study shows, in agreement with the previous merger literature, that manage-
ment at all levels is important for the development and outcome of the merger process (Schrib-
er, 2006). The prescription from the normative literature on successful change management is 
that management should adopt a linear, planned, top-down approach in radical change  (Ham-
mer & Champy, 1993; Kotter, 1996). Researchers who take this point of view typically attribute 
successful outcomes to the skills and abilities of a “strong individual leadership” (Ibid.). How-
ever, the conclusions of this study do not agree with this finding. Although a planned, top-down 
approach prescribed by classic functional theorists was followed by the management both at the 
hospital level (Study II) and at the clinical level (see Department X in Study III), that straight-
forward, top-down approach based on “strong individual leadership” contributed strongly to the 
unexpected and unintended results (i.e. the unsuccessful outcome). Instead of following a top-
down, linear path, the process followed a non-linear, unpredictable and uncontrolled path. The 
findings of this study suggest that an incremental, emergent, bottom-up approach seems to be a 
better post-merger management strategy (see Department Y in Study III), as confirmed by other 
merger studies of professional organizations (Empson, 2000, 2001; Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 
2006.). 
  
One explanation of why an incremental, emergent, bottom-up approach works better for profes-
sional organizations is, as mentioned, that management has limited control over the critical 
knowledge-intensive activities (Birkinshaw et al., 2000) because they are performed by 
autonomous experts who tend to rely on their own judgement and expertise (Löwendahl, 2005). 
It has been shown there is a high risk that such professionals will leave an organization when 
changes are implemented by a top-down approach, taking their knowledge with them (Graeb-
ner, 2004; Greenwood et al., 1994). The initiative for change is assumed to depend upon the 
trust and the willingness of individual autonomous experts who, to great extent, control the in-
tegration process (Empson, 2000; Montgomery, 2001). There is clear evidence in both Study II 
and Study III that the professionals take a significant role in the early merger stages (see also 
Fulop et al., 2002, 2005). Several studies have also shown that since physicians as a profession 
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exercise power and successfully require autonomy, a planned, top-down approach is less suc-
cessful and less workable in health care (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004).  
 
According to the OB-school literature, the concept of “horizontal” cultural differences between 
merging organizations has long been pointed out as the main post-merger challenge and the 
main explanation of merger failures (see Section 2.3.4). Despite the Director’s focus on han-
dling the horizontal culture (Study II) conflicts predicted by the OB-school, this thesis shows 
that the primary challenge for management, both at the hospital level (Study II) and at the clini-
cal department level (Study III), is dealing with the “vertical” difference and the “institutional 
competition” between managerialism and professionalism. As this study mainly covers the first 
three years post-merger, the challenge from the horizontal tension may of course occur at later 
stages following the initial “vertical conflict” stages.  
 
The finding that vertical institutional conflict is a key driver of merger processes, and probably 
the main explanation of observed outcomes, is fairly consistent with previous research on hos-
pital mergers (see Section 2.2). This literature typically points to the critical role medical pro-
fessionals have in such mergers. Overall, researchers agree that clinical integration is a highly 
complex endeavour that takes time to complete. Again, the challenge is to build trust, to obtain 
professional buy-in and to deal with the resistance from the professionals (Bazzoli et al., 2004). 
However, there are very few studies that explicitly cite the vertical competition between man-
agerialism and professionalism as the most important explanatory factor in the development 
and outcome of hospital mergers. The two-sided vertical conflict between managerialism and 
professionalism is often explained as either the result of failed leadership or of the profession-
als’ resistance that impedes the pace of integration (Fulop et al., 2002, 2005). Although this 
study revealed that the obstruction by the professionals impeded clinical integration, many tra-
ditional merger studies on hospital mergers have continued to argue that horizontal tensions, 
clashes and other hindering factors between the merging organizations are the main reasons 
behind hospital merger failures. In similar way, the results from studies of university hospital 
mergers in the US are somewhat patchy as they place the horizontal tension in the centre (Kas-
tor, 2003; Cohen & Jennings, 2005), at the same time as they report the importance of the con-
flict between economic, medical and academic logics that obstruct integration (Kastor, 2003).   
 
 
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
In stark contrast to existing merger literature, the results of this thesis clearly point to the “verti-
cal conflict” of competing institutional logics (i.e. managerialism vs. professionalism) rather 
than to the “horizontal conflict” resulting from different organizational cultures as the main 
post-merger challenge, both at the hospital and clinical department levels. Kitchener (2002), 
grounding his reasoning on studies of university hospital mergers in the US, particularly one 
university hospital merger, describes how managers seek legitimacy by making the merger in-
disputable. The findings of this study agree with Kitchener’s observations. His explanatory 
model identifies phases in the pre- and post-merger processes that have similarities with the 
observations in this study. 
 
As the starting point, Kitchener uses the notion of conformance to myths (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) to explain the merger phenomenon in health care. Meyer and Rowan (1977: 344) argue 
that executives within highly institutionalized fields adopt innovations when (and because) they 
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constitute “manifestations of powerful institutional rules which function as highly rationalized 
myths that are binding”. This power of normative compulsion ensures that certain practices, as 
soon as they have been acknowledged, are adopted widely and uncritically not so much to exe-
cute tasks more efficiently but to gain legitimacy and cultural support (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
 
Political sociologists such as Brint and Karabel (1991: 355) argue that organizational analysts 
lack the theoretical tools with which to explain the antecedents of institutionalized myths and 
the ways in which they are established as social facts within “arenas of power relations”. Previ-
ous accounts tend to employ notions such as fashion cycles (Abrahamson, 1991; Staw & Ep-
stein, 2000) that ignore the fact that stakeholders drive these interests.    
 
Therefore Kitchener (2002) integrates selected concepts from political science and social 
movement theory to extend the capacity of institutional theory to explain organizational change 
in professional fields. His integrated model addresses (a) the antecedents, (b) the processes and 
(c) the implications of institutional change processes that involve the uncritical adoption of 
managerial innovations in professional fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
The final part of Kitchener’s model is especially intriguing in relation to this study. In terms of 
predicted outcomes, the model suggests that the intended outcomes of managerial innovations 
such as mergers are unlikely to appear when they are “sedimented” upon the enduring features 
of professionalism. Cooper et al. (1996) show how the adoption of managerial innovations may 
not produce the intended outcomes within highly institutionalized fields in their exploration of 
the emergence of hybrid organizational forms that comprise “sedimented” structures and logics. 
This geological metaphor is used to describe the unstable organizational forms that emerge 
when managerial innovations such as mergers are imposed upon the institutional logic and deep 
structures of professionalism.  
 
 
Figure 2: Kitchener’s (2002) conceptual model for
managerial innovations in professional fields 
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7.2.1 An attempt to formulate a theoretical contribution 
Kitchener’s (2002) model of “managerial myths in professional fields” provides a useful start-
ing point for understanding why dysfunctional organizational outcomes are likely when mana-
gerial innovations are uncritically “sedimented” upon the deep structures of professionalism 
(Cooper et al., 1996). However, Kitchener’ (2002) model has not the capacity to fully explain 
the key findings of this study. First, the initial phase of the model referring to the antecedents 
does not explain why  an organizational innovation idea (e.g. a merger) may also originate from 
professionalism (i.e. the opposite institutional logic of managerialism). As a consequence, the 
mobilization phase does not account for the possibility that change agents, who represent com-
peting institutional logics, may initiate a merger by their co-operative acts. Finally and perhaps 
most importantly, the third phase of the model does not acknowledge the possibility that func-
tional outcomes may actually arise even when “executives jump on bandwagons to adopt cer-
tain myths uncritically” (Kitchener, 2002: 392). The empirical results of this study fit better 
with a development of the Kitchener model in the following way.  
 
 
 
The first phase of the organizational innovation – antecedents of the idea – includes both the 
logics of a professional organization, “professionalism” and “managerialism” as possible bases 
of organizational legitimacy. The second phase – mobilization of the idea – depicts the possibil-
ity of mobilizing support for an organizational idea through means convergence (i.e. the com-
peting logics are re-coupled and multiple stakeholders are united). Towards the right, the third 
phase – adoption of organizational idea – depicts the uncritical adoption of the merger idea, 
which in our case was the effect of an unexpected change of decision logic (triggered by a criti-
cal incident).      
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Figure 3: An extended model proposed for
managerial innovations in professional fields 
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This study provides detailed data on the post-merger integration processes at two organizational 
levels: the hospital and the clinical department levels, that allows the link between the pre-
merger process and organizational outcomes to be explored more thoroughly than in Kitch-
ener’s (2002) original model, which largely addresses the pre-merger phases. By extending the 
model with additional phases in the post-merger process, the new model reveals the conditions 
and formula for a more prosperous alternative to dysfunctional outcomes: the scenario of func-
tional merger outcomes.  
 
The first new element is attributed to the critical role management at all organizational levels 
plays in its “interpretation of institutional pressures” (manifested by the formal mandate) and 
the change context (e.g. manifested by professionalism). Two possible options emerge from the 
empirical analysis: 1) an unfiltered interpretation of the formal mandate stemming from top-
down pressures on the legitimacy bases of a pure managerial logic; and 2) a re-interpretation of 
the formal mandate to address the competing institutional logics of professionalism and man-
agerialism.  
 
Moving further to the right, “implementation of change strategy” addresses the different change 
approaches observed in Study II and Study III. The top-down, planned approach demonstrated 
by the top management (see Study II) and the clinical manager at Department X (see Study III) 
follows the literature’s classic management prescription originating in the strategy school (see 
Section 2.3.3). The bottom-up, emergent approach demonstrated by the clinical managers at 
Department Y (see Study III) is consistent with the literature’s prescriptions for professional 
organizations originating in the process school (see Section 2.3.5). However, a closer analysis 
reveals that the management in Department Y (Study III) used an emergent change strategy 
within planned boundaries (set by top management), which reflects a more recent research 
stream that combines the emergent with the planned approach to change (e.g. Bamford & For-
rester, 2003; Bartunek, 2003). 
 
In Kitchener’s (2002) explanation of why mergers often lead to dysfunctional outcomes, he 
states that an “uncritical adoption” of an organizational innovation is likely to achieve only a 
“sedimented layer” of managerialism that does not penetrate the deep structures of professional-
ism.  
 
An important empirical contribution of this study is therefore the observation that functional 
outcomes were unexpectedly produced by one of the clinical cases. Functional outcomes were 
manifested through a successful clinical integration, which seemingly was a result of an 1) in-
terpretation of institutional pressures, 2) a change strategy and a 3) management system de-
signed to fit both the logics of professionalism and managerialism. This “hybrid approach to 
change” allowed a re-coupling of competing logics in a shared hybrid arena (at clinical depart-
ment level) as well as a classic de-coupling of them by dividing managerial responsibilities be-
tween the professional and administrative domains (typical for political organizations). In more 
practical terms, one formal manager managed issues “up-wards” to satisfy the needs of the for-
mal agenda and one informal manager managed issues “down-wards” to meet the demands of 
the professionals. 
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7.2.2 Practical implication 
It is evident from the findings of this and previous studies that competing logics easily cause 
high emotional and professional costs for “hybrids individuals” i.e. physician managers (Mont-
gomery, 2001), which may impede their important task of balancing competing logics of pro-
fessionalism and managerialism. Although Cooper et al. (1996) claim that hybrids are schizoid 
and unstable organizational forms, this study shows that the design of a stable enduring hybrid 
management systems is still possible (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004) and may de facto have 
better prospects for success than hybrid positions (i.e. physician managers). Such hybrid sys-
tems may even increase organizational legitimacy, when attempts to achieve radical change are 
made in organizations embedded in “deep structures” of profession 
 
 
7.2.3 Future research 
This alternative model of establishing managerial ideas in highly institutionalized fields is con-
sistent with neo-institutional theories on radical change that predict that convergent change 
rather than a radical change is more likely to occur in professionalized fields when there is a 
battle between the two competing logics of managerialism and professionalism (Greenwood et 
al., 2004; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002, 2004). However, assuming there will be further limitations 
to organizational reforms designed to achieve radical change due to the enduring legitimacy 
bases of professionalism, future researchers and policy-makers are encouraged to take a re-
newed interest in “hybridization” as a possible alternative to movements from one “pure” ar-
chetype to another. Hybrid arrangements encompassing competing logics appear to pose differ-
ent questions. Among these questions are governance questions about the required regulations 
and governance methods, organizational identity/culture questions about making sense of con-
flicting demands and coping with them, and the needed change processes for balancing compet-
ing institutional logics. The theories of radical change seem to be of less relevance in answering 
such research questions. Hybridization, as McNulty and Ferlie (2004) argue, may even show 
the way into a post-NPM era. 
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10 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 In 1997, Mölndal, Östra, and Sahlgrenska hospitals were merged into Sahlgrenska University Hospital. Note that 
only one hospital (i.e. Sahlgrenska hospital) was a university hospital pre-merger. Hence, this merger cannot be con-
sidered “a merger of equals” as opposed to the Karolinska University Hospital and Skåne University Hospital merger.  
ii
 M&As refer to listed companies in the private industry, which is inapplicable for health care organizations in public 
settings (such as in this study). 
iii
 Recently, researchers in this field (e.g. Golbe & Whit, 1988) have sought to identify potential causes of merger 
waves, which are said to be crucial in the forecasting of merger activity. While the general notion that mergers occur 
in waves is practically undisputed, there is no clear consensus on how to model and identify the precise timing of 
distinct merger waves. 
iv
 Economic history has pointed to five different merger waves in the business world. The merger wave of the 1980s 
and early 1990s differed substantially from that of the previous great boom of the 1960s and early 1970s, not only in 
terms of increased scale and geographical spread but also in terms of merger type (Ibid.). In the merger wave of the 
1960s and early 1970s, most combinations were of the conglomerate type. In contrast, most combinations during the 
merger wave of the 1990s and 2000s have been of the horizontal or related type (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992). Many 
of these mergers have also been cross-border, which has resulted in more research on global mergers, especially those 
taking place in East Asia and Europe (Søderberg &. Vaara,, 2003.). 
v
 Their synthesiszed review includes 101 articles, working papers, monographs, and books. They also 
claim that it is the first review to bring together both quantitative and qualitative research to assess organ-
izational change in health care.  
vi
 “Strategic fit” is commonly understood as the degree to which the merging firms complement or aug-
ment one another’s operations and strategies (see also Datta, 1991). Differences between merging com-
panies are generally framed in terms of complementarities, whereas similarities are framed in terms of 
synergies. 
vii
“ Organizational/cultural fit” refers to differences between the administrative and cultural practice of 
merging firms as well as personnel characteristics (see e.g. Datta, 1991; Sales & Mirvis, 1984). Accord-
ing to this “horizontal fit” perspective, the most problematic situations are those where the values and 
beliefs are contradictory. 
viii
 I.e. Managers’ tendency to be overenthusiastic and overconfident about merger outcomes in the 
merger planning stage. 
ix
 By outcome, this thesis refers to intermediate organizational outcomes (rather than the final outcome 
characteristic of biomedical research). See Study III for detailed information on our use of ‘outcome’. 
x In Study III, this aspect was handled by collecting interviews from both the managers (change agents) 
and the staff (change recipients).  
xi
 Because a “conventional approach to content analysis” was largely used, it will only be summarized in 
this section (see e.g. Hsieh & Shannon, 2002 for more details). A challenge to this approach is that it can 
easily be confused with other methods such as grounded theory. However, although grounded theory may 
seem to share a similar initial analytical approach, it goes beyond content analysis to develop theory.  
xii
 Driven by a political agenda, large and quick cost savings expected from the merger were based on 
SCC’s roughly calculated cost savings needed to balance the budget by the next political election (rather 
than by detailed calculations of potential synergies). 
xiii
 Calculated as €20 million in achieved savings (including surplus) in year 2005, divided by €1000 mil-
lion in annual turnover. 
